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ABSTRACT
This Article is a work of transnational legal history. Drawing upon
new research in foreign archives, it sheds new light on the life of
Thurgood Marshall, exploring for the first time an episode that he
cared very deeply about: his work with African nationalists on an
independence constitution for Kenya. The story is paradoxical, for
Marshall, a civil rights legend in America, would seek to protect the
rights of white landholders in Kenya who had gained their land
through discriminatory land laws, but were soon to lose political
power. In order to understand why Marshall would take pride in
entrenching property rights gained through past injustice, the Article
tells the story of the role of constitutional politics in Kenya’s
independence. While sub-Saharan Africa is often dismissed as a
region with “constitutions without constitutionalism,” the Article
argues that constitutionalism played an important role in Kenya’s
independence. Against a backdrop of violence, adversaries in Kenya
fought with each other, not with weapons of violence, but with
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constitutional clauses. The resulting Kenya Independence
Constitution would not function as an American-style icon, but in that
historical moment, constitutional politics aided a peaceful transition.
In this context, Marshall built compromise into his bill of rights for
Kenya to keep the parties together at the table.
Thurgood Marshall’s role in Kenya’s independence was limited, of
course, but in following this story we gain an entirely new perspective
on a major figure in American law. Before he began writing
constitutional law as a Justice in the United States, Marshall played
the role of a framer, crafting constitutional principles in the first
instance. From the intersecting narratives of Marshall’s travels and
Kenya’s constitutional development, we can also see constitutionalism
at work in new ways, as constitutional politics functioned as a peace
process. The Article also provides an historical example of a process
more familiar in our own day: the role of American lawyers in
constitution writing and nation building overseas.†
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That, to my mind, is really working toward democracy, when you can
give to the white man in Africa what you couldn’t give the black man
in Mississippi. It’s good.
1

—Thurgood Marshall (1977)

INTRODUCTION
“Thurgood Freezes as Kenyans Feud,”2 announced the Cleveland
Call and Post in a January 30, 1960 headline. The famous American
civil rights lawyer Thurgood Marshall was in London in 1960, and was
embroiled in a controversy. He had come at the invitation of Tom
Mboya, a young nationalist leader from Kenya. Marshall traveled first
to Kenya, and then to London to serve as an advisor to nationalists
during negotiations on a new constitution for Kenya, at the time a
British colony. But as the Call and Post reported it, “Marshall sat in a
London hotel room . . . ‘too cold by American standards’. . . sipping
‘warm beer’ and fretting for action,” as the British government and
the nationalists faced an impasse over constitutional advisors.3
What had brought Thurgood Marshall, a major figure in
American legal history, to this London hotel room? What role did
this American play in the dramatic developments that would lead to
Kenya’s independence? And how did this Kenya sojourn,
remembered so intently by Justice Marshall in later years, figure into

1. Thurgood Marshall, The Reminiscences of Thurgood Marshall (Columbia Oral History
Research Office, 1977), in THURGOOD MARSHALL: HIS SPEECHES, WRITINGS, ARGUMENTS,
OPINIONS, AND REMINISCENCES 413, 446 (Mark V. Tushnet ed., 2001) [hereinafter THURGOOD
MARSHALL].
2. Thurgood Freezes as Kenyans Feud, CLEVELAND CALL & POST, Jan. 30, 1960, at 1A.
3. Id.

01__DUDZIAK.DOC

724

1/11/2007 10:44 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:721

the constitutional thought of a man who would later write
constitutional law in America?
The story of Marshall and the Kenya Constitution has eluded the
4
attention of Marshall’s biographers. It is revealed in archives in the
United States and England, and in press accounts from Africa, the
United States, and England. This study reveals a portrait of Marshall
at midcareer as he grappled with legal rights in a new context. The
story may seem paradoxical, for Marshall, a champion of the rights of
African Americans in his role as chief NAACP Legal Defense Fund
(LDF) litigator, would support a Bill of Rights that protected the
rights of white landholders in Kenya. Whites were a numerical
minority in Kenya, yet they had long held a monopoly on the finest
agricultural land in the colony. Once it became clear in 1960 that
indigenous Africans would soon become the dominant political
power, a central question was the property rights of minorities in an
independent Kenya. Marshall sought to entrench minority safeguards
by including strong property rights protection in his draft Bill of
Rights. In doing so, Marshall accorded formal legal rights to a group
that he described as worse than the Ku Klux Klan.
Was Marshall’s support for the rights of whites who had been the
beneficiaries of a historic injustice—the longstanding racially
discriminatory distribution of land in the colony of Kenya—an
indication that his commitment was to formal equality, regardless of
material conditions? Was he simply oblivious to the impact of an
American-style conception of equality in a postcolonial society, in
keeping with the coming critique of law and development, that
American ideas of law reform are often ill-fitting in foreign lands?5
Was this paradoxical move in keeping with more personal goals: was

4. Brief accounts appear in ROGER GOLDMAN WITH DAVID GALLEN, THURGOOD
MARSHALL: JUSTICE FOR ALL 139, 153, 178–79 (1992); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL
RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936–1961, at 313 (1994);
and JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 284–86, 307–09
(1998). These works rely only on one or two oral history sources. This paper relies on archival
records including Thurgood Marshall’s papers and other collections at the Library of Congress,
U.S. State Department records at the U.S. National Archives, and British colonial records at
The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Public Records Office, Kew, England; on
African, British and American newspapers, as well as other documentary sources; and on new
oral history interviews conducted by the author.
5. David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on
the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062, 1074–75;
John Henry Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline &
Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457, 466, 471 (1977).
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his support for whites in Kenya a foreign parallel to his later embrace
of a white successor, Jack Greenberg, which some have seen as
Marshall’s effort to curry favor with white elites in the hope of
6
advancing his own career? Or is there a different story to tell about
this Kenya sojourn, captured in Marshall’s own words, that in his own
necessarily imperfect way he sought to do the work of democracy,
and that in this context democracy required that a historically
oppressed group, upon assuming power, must reach out and accord
entrenched rights to those who had oppressed them? One aim of this
narrative is to explore these questions.
Thurgood Marshall’s story intersects with another narrative: the
story of Kenya’s first constitution as an independent nation. The
boundaries of what would become the nation of Kenya had been
drawn by colonial powers during the “scramble for Africa” in the
7
1880s. Colonial lines brought together different tribes, cultures, and
languages into what would become one nation, and these lines also
divided particular tribal lands between what would become one
country and another.8 The only authority that had governed the entire
territory was the departing colonial regime. The constitution writing
that happened in Africa in the early 1960s occurred in this
particularly precarious context for nation-building.9 The difficulties in
constitutionalism in sub-Saharan Africa are legion, leading to the
widespread belief that the region has “constitutions without
constitutionalism.”10 As a result, even as constitutional studies take a

6. See ROBERT L. CARTER, A MATTER OF LAW: A MEMOIR OF STRUGGLE IN THE
CAUSE OF EQUAL RIGHTS 145–47 (2005) (“[Marshall] thought . . . that in choosing a white man
to take his position, he was making clear that he would operate within an accepted racerelations format.”).
7. See generally THOMAS PAKENHAM, THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA: WHITE MAN’S
CONQUEST OF THE DARK CONTINENT FROM 1876 TO 1912 (1992) (chronicling the colonization
of Africa in the late nineteenth century); ROBERT L. TIGNOR, THE COLONIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF KENYA: THE KAMBA, KIKUYU, AND MAASAI FROM 1900 TO 1939 (1976)
(discussing the colonization process from the perspective of three different African tribes).
8. JOHN READER, AFRICA: A BIOGRAPHY OF A CONTINENT 569–78 (1997).
9. See generally JEFFREY HERBST, STATES AND POWER IN AFRICA: COMPARATIVE
LESSONS IN AUTHORITY AND CONTROL (2000) (discussing the weakness of African states at
independence, and the consequences of their inability to project power across national
territory).
10. H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions Without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an
African Political Paradox, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE
CONTEMPORARY WORLD 65 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993). But see generally H. Kwasi
Prempeh, Marbury in Africa: Judicial Review and the Challenge of Constitutionalism in
Contemporary Africa, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1239 (2006) (critiquing Okoth-Ogendo).
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transnational turn, comparative constitutional scholars tend to take
interest only in the one African nation seen as successful: South
11
Africa. Because Kenya became a corrupt and authoritarian regime
by the 1980s, perhaps constitutionalism in the country has “failed,”
and there is nothing to learn from this “failure.” But in the records
from Kenya, an interesting picture emerges. Against a backdrop of
violence, in the early 1960s, groups that had been killing each other—
African nationalists, white farmers, the colonial government—fought
with each other over the things they held most dear, land and political
power, not with weapons of violence but with constitutional clauses.
As violence erupted in the Congo, South Africa, and elsewhere in the
early 1960s, in Kenya the result of constitutional bargaining was
peaceful regime change. Constitutional politics aided that important
achievement in Kenya, even if constitutionalism could not shield the
country from the national and international political forces that
11. The first edition of a leading comparative constitutional law casebook, VICKI C.
JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1999), included only
three entries on Africa not related to South Africa, all on the theme of the failure of African
constitutionalism. The second edition of the casebook includes more entries on Africa not
related to South Africa, and not centered on the failure of constitutionalism, e.g., pertaining to
popular participation in constitution-making in Rwanda. See VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK
TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 288, 1115, 1604–05 (2d ed. 2006). In a recent
collection of essays by the same editors, the thirteen essays include Dullah Omar, Constitutional
Development: The African Experience, in DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 175 (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2002) (setting a discussion
of South Africa within the broader context of African constitutional development). See also
Adel Omar Sherif, Modern Constitutional Developments in the Arab World: The Case of Judicial
Review in Egypt and Its Impact on Other Arab Countries, in DEFINING THE FIELD OF
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra, at 71. In another major casebook, South Africa
dominates the materials related to Africa, but there are discussions of African cases and
constitutions on various topics, including standing and dignitary rights. NORMAN DORSEN ET
AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS (2003). Works that discuss
constitutionalism in Africa more thoroughly include JOHN HATCHARD ET AL., COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMONWEALTH: AN EASTERN AND
SOUTHERN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE (2004), J. OLOKA-ONYANGO, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
AFRICA: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES, FACING CHALLENGES (2001), and A.J. VAN DER WALT,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CLAUSES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1999). Important works
on South Africa have informed comparative scholarship. E.g., HEINZ KLUG, CONSTITUTING
DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALISM AND SOUTH AFRICA’S POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION (2000);
DONALD L. HOROWITZ, A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA?: CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING
IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY (1991). There is a long history of legal scholarship on Kenya,
particularly the work of Yash Ghai, a leading comparativist. E.g., Y.P. GHAI & J.P.W.B.
MCAUSLAN, PUBLIC LAW AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN KENYA: A STUDY OF THE LEGAL
FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1970). For U.S.
comparative constitutional law scholars, however, the region tends to be ignored, with the
exception of South Africa. The rich literature of African studies, including African legal studies,
remains largely cabined in “area studies.”
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would unravel Kenya’s first attempt at democracy. If we look at
12
we can see
constitutional moments in a different way,
constitutionalism at work in Kenya. Moments of constitutionalism
can have value in themselves, even if the result is not an Americanstyle iconic document that endures for ages to come.
Constitutionalism may have functioned only for a moment in Kenya
in the 1960s, but in that snapshot in time, the results nevertheless
were measurable and meaningful.
These two narratives—Thurgood Marshall’s and Kenya’s—come
together in a context that seems both foreign and familiar. Americans
have been framing constitutions for other countries in the many years
since the United States Constitution was written. They have
sometimes been official American government representatives. Other
13
times they have played this role as private citizens. For Thurgood
Marshall, the role of framer gave him an opportunity to imagine
constitutionalism unconstrained by the American text. Marshall
would later criticize the original United States Constitution as a
14
constitution that embraced slavery. In Kenya, as he saw it, he could
start from scratch and get it right from the start. But as the story
would unfold, getting it right ultimately involved accommodation and
compromise. It involved striking a balance not unlike one struck by

12. For the conventional approach to the idea of constitutional moments, see BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 7 (1998) (arguing that the U.S. Constitution
was informally amended during the “transformational” New Deal period, providing
constitutional legitimacy for the activist welfare state). For Ackerman, a “constitutional
moment” marks a transition in a nation’s constitutional regime, ratifying a new vision which
then becomes entrenched as part of the nation’s constitution, and constrains everyday politics.
The constitutional moment in this story is instead a period of time when constitutional politics
aid democratization. The fact that a constitutional vision from that moment does not constrain
everyday politics in time number two does not mean that constitutionalism did not work in a
powerful and important way in time number one.
13. See PAUL D. CARRINGTON, SPREADING AMERICA’S WORD: STORIES OF ITS LAWYERMISSIONARIES 4 (2005) (detailing “American lawyers’ efforts to take American legal ideas to
other nations”); Noah Feldman, Imposed Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. REV. 857 (2005)
(discussing U.S. involvement in Iraqi constitutional development); GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS:
THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, AND IMPORTATION OF A NEW LEGAL ORTHODOXY (Yves
Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2002) (examining interdisciplinary perspectives on the effort to
export a U.S.-oriented version of the “rule of law”).
14. Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987); see also William W. Fisher, III, The Jurisprudence of Justice
Marshall, 6 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 131, 135–36 (1989) (noting Justice Marshall’s “notorious
resistance to the sanctification of the Constitution”). I thank Kimberle Crenshaw who first
encouraged me to consider Marshall’s Bicentennial address in relation to his work on Kenya,
and Lani Guinier who emphasized Marshall’s role as a framer.
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the U.S. framers he criticized: an affirmative accommodation of
injustice to enable an ongoing political dialogue.
Ultimately, this rich and unusual story gives us a window not
only into the constitutional thought of someone who would soon
write American constitutional law, but also gives us a window into
constitutional politics. Constitution writing often happens against a
15
backdrop of violence. In that environment, constitution writing can
be a peace process. Whether constitutionalism has worked or failed in
Africa and other regions cannot be determined simply by looking for
later signs of American-style constitutions and judicial review. In
Kenya, for a short period of time, constitutional politics provided a
structured and nonviolent forum for political warfare. It is when we
look for signs like this outside of courts that we get a fuller picture of
how constitutionalism works, and what constitutional politics can do.
I. “MR. CIVIL RIGHTS”
When Thurgood Marshall boarded a plane for his first trip to
Africa in January 1960, a trip to aid nationalists in Kenya, he was
following a well-worn path. African Americans had long been
interested in Africa. The earliest organized efforts by African
Americans to aid African nations were missionary groups hoping to
“Christianize and civilize” Africa in the nineteenth century.16 Later
generations saw in Africa not a primitivism in need of redemption,
17
but a source of the history of a people. W.E.B. DuBois organized a
series of Pan-African conferences with the goal of uniting peoples of
African descent and aiding African liberation, and Pan-Africanism
became a major theme in twentieth century relations between
African Americans and Africa.18 Support for Africa was often
15. See generally Kim Lane Scheppele, Constitutional Interpretation after Regimes of
Horror (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Pub. Law Working Paper No. 05, 2000), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=236219 (arguing that through constitutionwriting, countries have sometimes tried to make a sharp break with a past regime of horror);
Kim Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying CrossConstitutional Influence Through Negative Models 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 296 (2003) (arguing that
negative models have played an important role in constitutional development).
16. JAMES H. MERIWETHER, PROUDLY WE CAN BE AFRICANS: BLACK AMERICANS AND
AFRICA, 1935–1961, at 12 (2002).
17. Id. at 9–20. See generally JAMES CAMPBELL, MIDDLE PASSAGES: AFRICAN AMERICAN
JOURNEYS TO AFRICA, 1787–2005 (2006).
18. P. OLISANWUCHE ESEDEBE, PAN-AFRICANISM: THE IDEA AND MOVEMENT, 1776–
1991, at 3 (2d ed. 1994); DAVID LEVERING LEWIS, W.E.B. DUBOIS: BIOGRAPHY OF A RACE,
1868–1919, at 8–9, 248–51, 574–78 (1994); DAVID LEVERING LEWIS, W.E.B. DUBOIS: THE
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complicated by the state of global affairs and U.S. foreign policy, and
19
this was especially so during the Cold War years. Even as Ralph
Bunche played a leadership role at the United Nations on trusteeship,
and eventual independence, for the colonies of the losing powers
after World War II, anticolonial organizations increasingly found
themselves on the wrong side of American Cold War politics.20 As
African Americans reached out to Africa during the 1950s and early
‘60s, their internationalism was constrained by the Cold War. Cold
War politics opened avenues for international engagement, as
African American cultural figures gained opportunities for
government-sponsored travel. Their very middle-class status was an
advertisement abroad of the multiracial character of American
society and was a rebuttal to Soviet propaganda that portrayed
American democracy as unjust due to racial segregation and
discrimination.21 But along with other activists, African Americans
sometimes lost their passports because of their politics. For Paul
Robeson, W.E.B. DuBois, and other African Americans barred from
travel during the early Cold War years, their tendency to criticize
American racism overseas was considered to be a particular threat, at
a time when international criticism of American racism was thought
to undermine U.S. foreign relations.22 Yet even when structured
through a Cold War frame, travel itself had an impact. James Baldwin
described the paradox of the African American soldier overseas,
discriminated against by the military, and yet “far freer in a strange
23
land than he has ever been at home.”
Marshall’s own exposure to African nationalists predated his
tenure at the NAACP. Marshall attended Lincoln University, the
FIGHT FOR EQUALITY AND THE AMERICAN CENTURY, 1919–1963, at 29–30, 37, 108–17, 208–11
(2000).
19. THOMAS BORSTELMANN, THE COLD WAR AND THE COLOR LINE: AMERICAN RACE
RELATIONS IN THE GLOBAL ARENA (2001).
20. BRIAN URQUHART, RALPH BUNCHE: AN AMERICAN ODYSSEY 125–28 (1993); PENNY
VON ESCHEN, RACE AGAINST EMPIRE: BLACK AMERICANS AND ANTICOLONIALISM, 1937–
1957, at 96–121 (1997).
21. PENNY M. VON ESCHEN, SATCHMO BLOWS UP THE WORLD: JAZZ AMBASSADORS
PLAY THE COLD WAR 58–91 (2004); MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE
AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 250–51 (2000).
22. MARTIN BAUML DUBERMAN, PAUL ROBESON 382–83 (1988); DUDZIAK, supra note
21, at 61–63; LEWIS, W.E.B. DUBOIS: THE FIGHT FOR EQUALITY AND THE AMERICAN
CENTURY, supra note 18, at 530–31, 554.
23. JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME 54 (1962); see also PAUL GILROY, THE BLACK
ATLANTIC: MODERNITY AND DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS 17–19 (1993) (describing the
transformative impact of travel).
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oldest historically black college in the United States. It was part of
Lincoln’s founding vision to train African Americans who would then
work in Africa, especially as missionaries. Many Africans attended
Lincoln over the years, and one of Marshall’s undergraduate
classmates was Nnamdi Azikiwe, who would later become President
of Nigeria.24 Through the 1950s, occasionally the NAACP would be
called upon to help Africans in the United States. Marshall took a
special interest in the case of Reuel Mugo Gatheru, a Lincoln student
from Kenya who was threatened with deportation in 1953. The
United States apparently sought to deport Gatheru because the
British believed he had ties to the ongoing Mau Mau uprising. The
NAACP was concerned that if the U.S. sent him back, he would be
persecuted by the colonial government. Marshall “expressed great
enthusiasm at the possibility of being able to take over this particular
case,” and made inquiries on his behalf at the Justice Department.25
Marshall’s trip to Africa did not only carry on a tradition of
African American engagement with the continent. He was also an
early proponent of what would come to be called “law and
development.” By the time Thurgood Marshall went to Kenya,
Americans had long conceptualized the world as divided into
“developed” and “underdeveloped” spaces.26 President Harry
Truman had argued in 1949 that there were widespread benefits from
promoting economic expansion, for “[g]reater production is the key
to prosperity and peace.”27 Technical expertise would bring about
“development,” and soon American lawyers lent a hand in bringing

24. HORACE MANN BOND, EDUCATION FOR FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF LINCOLN
UNIVERSITY, PENNSYLVANIA 487–550 (1976); GOLDMAN WITH GALLEN, supra note 4, at 24–
25; Levi A. Nwachuku, Nnamdi Azikiwe and Lincoln University: An Analysis of a Symbiotic
Relationship, LINCOLN J. SOC. & POL. THOUGHT (Fall 2002), available at http://www.lincoln.
edu/history/journal/azikwe.htm; see also David McBride, Africa’s Elevation and Changing
Racial Thought at Lincoln University, 1854–1886, 62 J. NEGRO HIST. 363 (1977); Sibusiso
Nkomo, Strong Ties: Past and Present, LINCOLN J. SOC. & POL. THOUGHT 19–20 (Summer
1990).
25. Herbert L. Wright to Gloster Current (Jan. 12, 1953), Folder: Africa – Kenya, 1952-55,
Box A5, Papers of the NAACP, Group II, General Office Files, 1940-55, Library of Congress. A
committee to support Gatheru had already retained counsel, however, so an embarrassed
Horace Mann Bond, President of Lincoln, had to withdraw a request for NAACP legal support.
Horace M. Bond to Herbert L. Wright (Jan. 23, 1953), Folder: Africa – Kenya, 1952-55, Box A5,
Papers of the NAACP, Group II, General Office Files, 1940-55, Library of Congress.
26. ARTURO ESCOBAR, ENCOUNTERING DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING
OF THE THIRD WORLD 3–12 (1995).
27. Inaugural Address, 1949 PUB. PAPERS 112, 115 (Jan. 20, 1949).
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28
law to bear to aid “underdeveloped” nations. By the 1960s,
development discourse was so ubiquitous in thinking about Africa
and other “Third World” nations, that, as Arturo Escobar put it,
“reality . . . had been colonized by the development discourse,” and
“it seemed impossible to conceptualize social reality in other terms.”29
Marshall had no meaningful background in Kenya law, politics,
and culture before his trip, but within an understanding of the world
framed by a development continuum, he had something that an
“underdeveloped” area like Kenya needed: expertise in a
“developed” legal system.
Marshall had brought his legal skills to bear on matters outside
U.S. borders before 1960. During the Korean War, Marshall
responded to pleas of African American soldiers who had received
harsh sentences for misconduct. Korea was the first major U.S.
military engagement since President Truman had issued an executive
order to desegregate the military in 1948, and many have argued that
it was the Korean War that finally accomplished desegregation in the
Army, as it became impractical to send needed replacement troops
30
according to race. But as reports came out of alleged disparities in
disciplinary actions based on race, resulting in horrific sentences for
African American soldiers, Marshall was concerned about
discrimination. He traveled to Japan and then to Korea to research
the cases, interviewing soldiers near the front lines. Ultimately he was
successful in reducing the sentences of thirty soldiers.31

28. See James C.N. Paul, Foreword to LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: FACING COMPLEXITY IN
21ST CENTURY vii–xi (John Hatchard & Amanda Perry-Kessaris eds., 2003) (describing
historical development of “law and development”); Merryman, supra note 5, at 462–63 (“Law,
properly employed, is . . . an instrument of development.”); Trubek & Galanter, supra note 5, at
1066 (describing how legal scholars, through their involvement in action agencies, became
exposed to legal issues of the Third World).
29. ESCOBAR, supra note 26, at 5. On the critique of law and development, see, e.g., J.
Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 470 (1995) (stating
that scholars who critique Law and Development’s reliance on Western ethnocentrism are
thereafter prevented from promoting said Western values that are, in fact, integral to the
scholars’ perspectives); Trubek & Galanter, supra note 5 (arguing that law and development
academics have been faced with a crisis that has impeded their ability to establish law and
development as an area of law).
30. RICHARD M. DALFIUME, DESEGREGATION OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES: FIGHTING
ON TWO FRONTS, 1939–1953, at 201 (1969); BERNARD C. NALTY, STRENGTH FOR THE FIGHT: A
HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICANS IN THE MILITARY 255–69 (1986).
31. GOLDMAN WITH GALLEN, supra note 4, at 112–16; Thurgood Marshall, Summary
Justice: The Negro GI in Korea, in THURGOOD MARSHALL, SUPREME JUSTICE: SPEECHES AND
WRITINGS 134–41 (J. Clay Smith, Jr. ed., 2003); TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 311–12.
THE
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Marshall represented these soldiers in Korea during the early
1950s when he also shouldered the burdens, and nourished the hopes,
of the long legal struggle that resulted in Brown v. Board of
32
Education. However, Marshall faced the world in a different posture
in 1960. Brown was won, and in the eyes of the nation, his name was
forever associated with that compelling victory. The way his colleague
Constance Baker Motley saw it, the case made Marshall the
“undisputed spokesman for black America.”33 Time magazine
solidified his status, putting him on its cover in 1955.34 But the years
after Brown were difficult ones for him. According to Motley,
[h]e was simultaneously exhilarated and awestruck by his leadership
position in black people’s struggle for equality. At times, he seemed
immobilized by the inherent responsibility to move forward with
implementation; at other times, he was literally overwhelmed by the
onrush of events that the decision set in motion. It was like trying to
35
navigate a ship in a hurricane.

The Supreme Court, in 1955, undercut his hard-won victory by
36
requiring only “all deliberate speed” in Brown’s implementation.
The decision was widely viewed as allowing delay. The Supreme
Court would not announce that “[t]he time for mere ‘deliberate
speed’ has run out,” until 1964.37 In 1960, less than 6 percent of
African American children in the South attended non-segregated
38
schools. Marshall was frustrated with this lack of progress. At the
same time, his attention was drawn away from enforcement efforts as
the NAACP and the LDF lawyers found themselves under attack in
the South. Resistance to Brown would take many forms, and one of
those forms was a campaign to harass civil rights lawyers. National
32. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
33. CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY
110 (1998).
34. TIME, Sept. 19, 1955, at front cover.
35. MOTLEY, supra note 33, at 110; accord Constance Baker Motley, Oral History
Interview, conducted by Mary L. Dudziak, New York, N.Y. (Nov. 8, 2004).
36. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
37. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964).
38. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 284; see also CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, AFTER BROWN:
THE RISE AND RETREAT OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 56 (2004) (noting that, in 1960–1961,
100 percent of black students in the South attended schools that were at least 90 percent
nonwhite); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES: 1965, at 122 tbl.162 (1965) (stating that, in November 1960, 23 percent of
black students in Southern states attended schools in desegregated districts and 7 percent
attended schools that had white students).
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and regional NAACP leaders were targets of Cold War
39
antisubversive investigations conducted by Southern states.
The civil rights movement regained its momentum in 1960, but
civil rights lawyers were no longer the leading edge. Sit-ins and civil
disobedience had been a strategy drawn upon by some activists in
earlier years, but when four African American college students in
Greensboro, North Carolina, sat-in at a whites-only lunch counter in
February 1960, a broad-based sit-in movement seemed to erupt
40
overnight. The LDF soon had to consider what its relationship
would be to a movement whose agenda was framed principally by

Thurgood Marshall at the Supreme Court for arguments in Cooper v. Aaron, August
22, 1958. With him are NAACP leader Daisy Bates and six of the nine students whose
enrollment at Central High School set off the Little Rock school desegregation crisis
in 1957. © Corbis.

39.
40.

TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 295.
WILLIAM CHAFE, CIVILITIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS 99 (1980); AUGUST MEIER &
ELLIOTT RUDWICK, CORE: A STUDY IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1942–1968, at 101
(1973).
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others. According to Mark Tushnet, “Marshall and other NAACP
41
leaders were ambivalent about the sit-in tactic at first.” As
Constance Baker Motley remembered it, “the NAACP and LDF had
consciously avoided urging individuals to risk arrest by defying local
Jim Crow laws and customs,” because under existing Supreme Court
doctrine on state action, private restaurants and other public
42
accommodations might be protected from liability. Another concern
the lawyers had was that “a new group of leaders might displace
them. Robert Carter believed that . . . providing too much support for
sit-ins ‘would tie us to something that some other organization has
taken and run with.’”43
Marshall was quite uncomfortable with another development,
the increasingly popular Nation of Islam, and with ideas of black
separatism or black power. In response to Nation of Islam calls for
racial solidarity among African Americans in 1955, Marshall said,
“Let’s stop drawing the line [between] colored and white . . . . Let’s
44
draw the line on who wants democracy for [America].” In 1959
Nation of Islam spokesmen denounced Marshall “as a middle-class
lawyer with strong ties to the black elite and the white
establishment.”45 They called him a “half-white nigger,” who worked
46
“hand in glove with the white folks.” Malcolm X called him a
“fool.”47 Marshall disliked the separatism advocated by the Nation.
As Juan Williams has suggested, it was contrary to Marshall’s
48
constitutional vision. He was uncomfortable as well with Nation of
Islam tactics, seeing them as inflaming African Americans during
times of crisis, when his role had been to calm things down in the
hope of avoiding bloody confrontations.49

41. TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 309.
42. MOTLEY, supra note 33, at 131.
43. TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 310. Other concerns included the fact that, because the
students were often prosecuted for crimes like disturbing the peace or trespassing, there was a
serious question as to whether there was a valid legal theory on which to base a broad challenge
to the prosecutions. Handling hundreds of individual cases in state court also would take
tremendous resources. Id.; WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 286–89.
44. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 241.
45. Id. at 275.
46. Id. at 275–76.
47. Id. at 276.
48. Id. at 278
49. Id.; E.U. ESSIEN-UDOM, BLACK NATIONALISM: A SEARCH FOR AN IDENTITY IN
AMERICA 283 (1971).
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Thurgood Marshall had also reached a point in his life, at the age
of fifty-one, that he wanted to spend more time with his family.
Following the death of his first wife, Vivian, in 1955, he married
Cecelia Suyat, and by 1960 they had two children. After getting by for
years on the salary of a civil rights lawyer, Marshall wished that he
could earn more to better support his family.50 He was a legendary
lawyer, yet his future path remained unclear. Marshall thought that
he would never become a judge because Southern Democrats in the
Senate would block his confirmation. This aspiration, of course,
would come to pass not long after Marshall went to Kenya. He was
appointed by President John F. Kennedy in a recess appointment to
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 1961. After confirmation
51
hearings were dragged out over nearly a year, he was confirmed.
Marshall would leave the judiciary in 1965 to be Solicitor General of
the United States under President Lyndon Johnson. In 1967, Johnson
nominated Marshall to the United States Supreme Court. In the
altered political landscape of 1967, he was easily confirmed.52
Marshall cannot have imagined this trajectory in 1960. He was
instead a man who had secured his place in American legal history,
yet he remained unsure of the impact of his life’s work, and unsure of
his own future.
Along with so many of his contemporaries, Marshall was a Cold
Warrior, so it was not difficult for him to operate within the
constraints of Cold War/civil rights discourse, in which it was
acceptable to criticize U.S. race discrimination at home, but overseas
it was important to argue that American democracy was a superior
53
form of government to communism for peoples of color. In an era of
54
vicious red-baiting of civil rights activists, Marshall believed that it

50. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 242–43, 250, 272–74.
51. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 293–303. See generally Richard Revesz, Thurgood
Marshall’s Struggle, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237 (1993) (describing the lengthy confirmation process).
52. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 312, 328–31, 337.
53. See DUDZIAK, supra note 21, at 12–15, 29, 61–77 (describing the way Cold War politics
narrowed acceptable civil rights discourse within the United States and U.S. government
surveillance of those who criticized American race discrimination overseas).
54. See, e.g., GERALD HORNE, BLACK AND RED: W.E.B. DUBOIS AND THE AFROAMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE COLD WAR, 1944–1963 (1986) (describing red-baiting of W.E.B.
DuBois and other civil rights activists); MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM AND
REBELLION: THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION IN BLACK AMERICA 13–39 (2d rev. ed. 1991)
(describing Cold War-era repression of civil rights activists for a perceived alliance with
communism); KENNETH O’REILLY, RACIAL MATTERS: THE FBI’S SECRET FILE ON BLACK
AMERICA, 1960–1972 (1989) (describing pervasive U.S. government surveillance of civil rights
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was in his interest to maintain strategic ties with potential threats,
55
including J. Edgar Hoover, a man he had long criticized. Later, as a
federal judge, Marshall would travel to Kenya on a trip sponsored by
the U.S. Information Agency for the purpose of improving the U.S.
image abroad.56 Marshall’s 1960 trip, however, was that of a private
citizen. He later speculated that perhaps the CIA had funded it.57
Previously secret, now declassified, U.S. State Department and
British government internal documents expressed surprise and initial
displeasure upon hearing of Marshall’s involvement.58 It is entirely
possible that there was covert CIA financial support, but there is no
evidence to support the idea that Marshall himself collaborated with
the U.S. or British government before he began his work with Kenya
nationalists.
Tom Mboya would be Marshall’s initial tie with nationalists in
59
Kenya. Mboya was a young, dynamic emerging leader in Kenya in
the 1950s. A labor activist, Mboya became active in the International

activists); ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES: MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA 391–92
(1998) (noting white supremacists’ use of anticommunism as a method of suppressing civil rights
efforts).
55. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 325–26; see also Thurgood Marshall, FBI File, available at
http://foia.fbi.gov/foiaindex/marshall.htm (containing 1,394 pages of information kept by the
FBI on Marshall). Extensive FBI surveillance of Marshall began in the 1940s. The Bureau was
particularly interested in Marshall because of his criticism of the FBI and the Justice
Department for failure to investigate and prosecute lynching cases. See, e.g., Nichols to Tolson
(Oct. 18, 1947), Thurgood Marshall, FBI File, Part VI, at 465–82, available at http://foia.fbi.gov/
marshall/tmarsh4.pdf (14 page memorandum summarizing FBI contacts with Marshall,
prepared to enable response to Marshall’s criticism.) There are only two documents in
Marshall’s voluminous FBI file showing collaboration by Marshall with the FBI. I am grateful to
Scott Dixler for his research on this topic.
56. Berl Bernhard, Oral History Interview, conducted by Mary L. Dudziak, Washington,
D.C. (July 16, 2003). Many federal judges went on such government-sponsored trips. Marshall’s
traveling companion, Berl Bernhard, was asked to help write part of a draft speech for Chief
Justice Earl Warren to deliver in what was then Tanganyika. Bernhard’s task was to address
foreign criticism of U.S. race discrimination. Id.
57. Marshall, supra note 1, at 446–47.
58. See Amembassy London to Sec’y of State, Telegram no. 555 (Jan. 13, 1960), Records of
the Department of State, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1960–63, 745R.00/1-1360, National
Archives, College Park, Maryland (“Colonial Office noted with tinge of apprehension
appointment Thurgood Marshall as Advisor to African elected members and expressed hope
Marshall had Commonwealth constitutional experience.”).
59. Marshall’s relationship with Jomo Kenyatta is more well-known, but during the 1960
constitutional negotiations, Kenyatta was in detention in Kenya, and Marshall did not meet him.
See DAVID ANDERSON, HISTORIES OF THE HANGED: THE DIRTY WAR IN KENYA AND THE
END OF EMPIRE 63–68 (2005) (discussing Kenyatta’s detention).
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60
Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Through this work, Mboya
developed ties with labor activists around the world, including Walter
Reuter of the United Auto Workers Union, and A. Philip Randolph,
President of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, an important
African American labor union.61 In 1959, Mboya returned to the
United States to lecture and generate support for the rights of
Africans in Kenya. On a number of occasions he appeared with
Thurgood Marshall.62
It was after Mboya’s 1959 trip that he invited Marshall to serve as
advisor at the upcoming conference on the Constitution of Kenya.
Mboya apparently acted on his own. This was just one of Mboya’s
63
unilateral actions, which sometimes irritated his compatriots. But the
nationalists had much to gain by associating themselves with
Marshall. He was “Mr. Civil Rights” in the United States and he had
built his career through the promotion of minority rights. As Kenya
moved toward majority African representation in its legislature,
minority rights became a crucial issue. Having Marshall on board
therefore provided the Africans with a tangible means of reassuring
other groups that minority rights were central to their agenda as well.
Julius Kiano later recalled that Marshall “readily agreed to come to
Nairobi and then to come with us to London to be . . . our . . . main
constitutional advisor. And one of his major contributions was to
insist that, ‘You’ve got to have a Bill of Rights in that constitution.’
And so that was wonderful assistance that we got from him.”64

II. THE AFRICANS’ ADVISOR
Early 1960 was an unsettling time in the Colony of Kenya. When
the year began, Jomo Kenyatta, who would become the first

60. DAVID GOLDSWORTHY, TOM MBOYA: THE MAN KENYA WANTED TO FORGET 31–33
(1982).
61. Randolph corresponded with and advised Mboya and other Kenya nationalists during
the 1950s and 1960s. Letters from A. Philip Randolph to Tom Mboya (Sept. 16, 1958; Dec. 30,
1958; Mar. 4, 1959), Papers of A. Philip Randolph, Records of Brotherhood of Sleeping Car
Porters, Group II, Library of Congress; Letters from Tom Mboya to A. Philip Randolph (Nov.
28, 1958; July 17, 1958), Africa, Box 97, Papers of A. Philip Randolph, Records of Brotherhood
of Sleeping Car Porters, Group II, Library of Congress.
62. GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 60, at 116–20; WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 284; Tom
Mboya, Key Questions for Awakening Africa, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1959, at SM8.
63. GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 60, at 133.
64. Harry Kreisler, Kenyan Independence: The Early Years: Conversation with Julius
Kiano (Sept. 14, 1989), http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/Kiano/kiano2.html.
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65
President of Kenya, was in detention. Jailed in 1952 on suspicion
that he was a leader in the violent Mau Mau rebellion against British
Colonial rule, Kenyatta was thought to be so dangerous that he was
66
detained even though he had completed his sentence. Kenya politics
were constrained in other ways. Although a seven year state of
emergency, the Colonial government’s response to the Mau Mau, had
ended, new security legislation was in place which gave the Colonial
Governor “reserve powers with which to control all public gatherings
for political purposes, provide for the continuance of control over
African villages and require the registration of political parties.”67 A
“Detained and Restricted Persons Bill” would “enable the
Government to continue to restrain and hold persons for security
68
reasons without trial.” There was a ban on colony-wide political
organizations, which fractured the development of a new generation
of nationalist leaders.69 Although the British government tried to
contain African nationalism, 1960 was a political moment with a force
of its own. Colonialism had been steadily unraveling since World War
II. The United Nations created a trusteeship system, leading
eventually to emancipation of colonies of the Axis powers of
Germany and Italy. Anticolonial movements achieved independence
in India in 1948 and Ghana in 1957. 1960 would be known as the
“Year of Africa,” as seventeen African nations became independent
in that year alone.70
The end of colonialism in Africa was not a simple, gradual
evolutionary process, however, but was powerfully affected by
conditions within particular colonies, as well as politics in the
Metropole. Kenya differed from many emerging African nations in
that it had a sizeable white settler population. To encourage
immigration to the colony, the British government had reserved to
white settlers the richest agricultural land in Kenya, the “White

65. Kenyatta was Prime Minister of Kenya during the first year of independence. In 1964
the constitution was amended, changing the position of Prime Minister to President. KEITH
KYLE, THE POLITICS OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF KENYA 179, 199 (1999).
66. ANDERSON, supra note 59, at 63–68; WANYIRI KIHORO, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM: THE
STORY OF POLITICAL RESISTANCE IN KENYA 102–04 (2005).
67. Amconsul Nairobi to Dep’t of State, Despatch no. 337 (Jan. 8, 1960), Records of the
Department of State, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1960–63, 745R.00/1-860, National Archives.
68. Id.; accord Nairobi to Sec’y of State, Telegram no. 222 (Jan. 7, 1960), Records of the
Department of State, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1960–63, 745R.00/1-760, National Archives.
69. B.A. Ogot, The Decisive Years 1956–63, in DECOLONIZATION & INDEPENDENCE IN
KENYA 1940–93, at 48, 52–53 (B.A. Ogot & W.R. Ochieng’ eds., 1995).
70. H.S. WILSON, AFRICAN DECOLONIZATION 177 (1994).
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71
Highlands.” Africans were not allowed to own land in these areas.
This led not only to concerns about racism and to a need for land
reform; it also complicated Kenya’s economic future, because the
colony’s principal tie with global economic markets was large-scale,
white-dominated agriculture. By 1960, some white families were in
their third generation on their farms.72
Kenya would not experience an easy path to liberation. Large
white-owned farms had depended on African labor. This labor was
induced through a brutal colonial regime. In the 1950s, a resistance
movement, known as the Mau Mau rebellion, waged guerilla war on
the colonial government, white farmers, and African collaborators.
Sensational accounts of violence flooded the newsreels, while Britain
responded by detaining and torturing thousands of Africans and by
bombing their forest hideaways.73 The colonial government seemed to
have reasserted control over the colony in early 1960, but many in
Kenya remained wary. Even before Colonial Secretary Ian Macleod
announced that African majority representation in politics, and
eventually independence, were coming to Kenya, whites reacted
against upcoming constitutional talks and the very idea of African
political control.
Many thought that no safeguards would be strong enough to
protect the interests of white settlers in an African-run government.
Some Kenya residents therefore developed elaborate plans for a
transfer of white farms to Africans, and the departure of white
settlers from Kenya.74 Others argued that African rule simply must
not happen. A letter signed “E.M.J.” from Mombasa, Kenya to the
Colonial Secretary objected to the very idea of self-rule: “[T]he
Negros [sic] of Kenya,” the writer insisted, “are not ruling persons,

71. KYLE, supra note 65, at 8–9, 23; see also TIGNOR, supra note 7, at 26 (describing how
European settlers expropriated highland lands that belonged to the indigenous African tribes
and converted those lands into large farms).
72. See generally KYLE, supra note 65 (describing the lengthy tenure of British settlers in
Kenya); TIGNOR, supra note 7 (discussing European settlers’ control over the Kenya economy).
73. ANDERSON, supra note 59, at 230–88; E.S. ATIENO & JOHN LONSDALE, MAU MAU
AND NATIONHOOD: ARMS, AUTHORITY, AND NARRATION 227–50 (2003); CAROLINE ELKINS,
IMPERIAL RECKONING: THE UNTOLD STORY OF BRITAIN’S GULAG IN KENYA 31–61 (2005).
74. Nicholas D. Hayne-Upson to Sec’y of State for the Colonies (Jan. 13, 1960), Folder:
Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1960, Miscellaneous Representations, CO 822/2349, The
National Archives of the United Kingdom: Public Records Office, Kew, England (with
attachments on A ‘Common Sense’ Appreciation of the Problem of White Settlement in Kenya);
Marion W. Knowles to Ian Macleod (Feb. 10, 1960), Folder: Kenya Constitutional Conference,
1960, Miscellaneous Representations, CO 822/2349, The National Archives of the United
Kingdom, Public Records Office, Kew, England.
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and they have no even knowledge [sic] of regime, . . . they are like
75
animals of the jungle and forest.” Others reacted more strongly. An
unidentified writer, in a letter to the Colonial Secretary and others,
said, “Dear Sirs, After ten meetings 2500 of us have decided that if
you give the African equal voting power as the Europeans in this
country we will blow up everything in Kenya. Then the African can
76
start from the beginning the same as we did.” The writer said in a
follow-up, “we will not leave one railway Bridge, Power Station, or
any Government Building standing.” There would be “nothing left in
Kenya worth having.”77
The stakes at the upcoming constitutional conference were high.
Said one woman in Kenya, “Everything here is hanging on this
Conference, and whatever happens I expect it will result in strikes
and riots at this end. Most people’s one idea is to sell out quickly, tho’
78
who is going to buy is quite another matter.” Meanwhile, although
the large-scale prison camps of the emergency regime were
disbanded, many Africans continued to be detained by the colonial
government. Countless others had not survived. For the Kikuyu, the
tribe at the center of Mau Mau, the time after the emergency was a
time of less brutality, but of continuing trauma.79
In these difficult circumstances, Thurgood Marshall embarked on
his first trip to Africa. He traveled to Kenya in January 1960, and met
with Kenyan nationalists.80 As he remembered it, “[T]he restrictions
75. E.M.J. to Colonial Sec’y (Jan. 9, 1960), Folder: Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1960,
Miscellaneous Representations, CO 822/2349, The National Archives of the United Kingdom,
Public Records Office, Kew, England.
76. Anonymous to Colonial Sec’y Macleod, Blundell, and [illegible] (Jan. 1960), Folder:
Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1960, Miscellaneous Representations, CO 822/2349, The
National Archives of the United Kingdom, Public Records Office, Kew, England.
77. Anonymous to Colonial Sec’y Macleod (received Jan. 15, 1960), Folder: Kenya
Constitutional Conference, 1960, Miscellaneous Representations, CO 822/2349, The National
Archives of the United Kingdom, Public Records Office, Kew, England.
78. Mrs. Buckley-Mathews to Vera H. Whaler (extract of letter) (received Jan. 29, 1960),
Folder: Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1960, Miscellaneous Representations, CO 822/2349,
The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Public Records Office, Kew, England.
79, ANDERSON, supra note 59, at 332–33 (discussing how released detainees returned to
their homes to find their land and other property lost or confiscated, were forced to do
communal labor, and were prevented from becoming involved with politics); ELKINS, supra
note 73 at 340–53 (discussing how even after accounts of brutality by the colonial government
came to light and the British Parliament voted against authorizing an independent inquiry into
the detainee camps, there were reports of continuing beatings, even some resulting in death, at
detainee camps which were still operating in 1959).
80. U.S. Negro Leader Arrives in Kenya, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1960, at 5. On the way to
Kenya he spent five days in Liberia.
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were almost unbelievable. Africans could not hold a meeting in a
81
building. So as a result, the only meetings they had were outside.”
Some nationalist leaders, including Jomo Kenyatta, “were under
82
detention orders.” Marshall met with a delegation, including Tom
Mboya and Hastings Banda: “I listened to them and took their
instructions, and . . . I left Kenya after a week or so under great
83
handicap.”
Marshall was quickly introduced to race relations in colonial
Kenya. On his second day in the colony, he went to the town of
Kiambu for a meeting of the African Elected Members Organization.
As Marshall later recounted,
[T]here were two thousand Africans standing out in the field,
perfectly quiet, and the leaders were meeting in the building but
they couldn’t go in. The leaders were in one building. They were
out. They were standing out in that hot sun, all day, waiting for the
84
leaders to come out and report to them.

Before Marshall could enter the building and join the meeting, the
district officer intervened. He “introduced himself, very politely, like
85
the British always are, and he said, ‘What do you propose to do?’”
I said, “I’m going in there. That’s what I came over here for, was to
talk to these people.”
He said, “Well, you can’t go in there.”
I said, “Why?”
He said, “You don’t have a permit.”

81. Marshall, supra note 1, at 444.
82. Id.
83. Id. Marshall’s work on the Kenya constitution was funded by a man he thought to be a
multimillionaire, but who he later discovered “had less money that I did. Then, I got two and
two—and I still suspect it was CIA money, that’s all I could—I know it wasn’t Commie money,
so what else could it be? I don’t know.” Id. at 446–47. A Freedom of Information Act request
filed by the author with the CIA resulted in no records pertaining to Thurgood Marshall. At this
point there is no evidence to support or undermine Marshall’s speculation. Some of Marshall’s
later overseas travel was funded by the State Department and the U.S. Information Agency.
84. Id. at 444.
85. Id.; Amconsul Nairobi to Dep’t of State, Despatch no. 349 (Jan. 15, 1960), Records of
the Department of State, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1960–63, 745R.03/1-1560, National
Archives.
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And Tom Mboya spoke up and he said, “Why, of course he has a
permit. We got one last week.”
86

He said, “Yes, and it was revoked yesterday.”

At that point, Marshall recounted,
I started to be loud and boisterous and get arrested, and suddenly it
dawned on me that if I was arrested, I’d be searched. I had money
and paraphernalia and stuff for Mboya and others in my pockets,
and if I was caught with that, I would really spend the rest of my life
87
in jail.

Instead, he politely said to the district officer, “Of course. I
understand. But before I leave, I wonder if I could just say a word to
88
all those people out there?”
They said, “Nope. No speeches.”
I said, “I’m not going to make a speech. Just let me say one word of
greeting.”
He said, “All right, all right, just one word.”
I said, “Okay,” and I jumped up on top of this station wagon that
Mboya was driving, and I looked over the crowd, and they all
recognized Tom Mboya, and I guess they knew who I was, I don’t
know.
Well, as I looked at them, I just shouted out real loud one word,
“Uhuru!” and pandemonium broke out. They all crowded, cheered,
and everything, and the district officer was really mad as all get out.
The reason was, the word “Uhuru” means “Freedom Now,” Not
tomorrow, but freedom right now.
And he said, “I told you not to—”
86. Marshall, supra note 1, at 444. The American Consul in Kenya described Marshall’s
exclusion from the meeting slightly differently, however the Consul did not witness these events
firsthand: “[T]he Acting District Commissioner refused him permission to enter the meeting,
saying that his name was not on the list of persons scheduled for attendance submitted at the
time the license was granted for the meeting.” Amconsul Nairobi to Dep’t of State, Despatch
no. 349, supra note 85.
87. Marshall, supra note 1, at 444.
88. Id.
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I said, “But I didn’t say but one word.”
So he told me where I’d better go right quick, so I did.

89

On January 14, Marshall held a press conference. According to
the American Consul, he told the press that “independence and
90
freedom for Kenya was due now.” Marshall said that he was “in
complete agreement with the constitutional proposals put forward by
91
the African Elected Members.” Marshall had spent the day in
Kenya’s White Highlands, and said that
he was in complete agreement with the Africans in Kenya about this
European area, i.e., that there was no reason for land to be
restricted on the basis of race anywhere in the world. He added,
however, that he would apply this principle to the African land areas
92
of Kenya as well as the White Highlands.

The press seemed unsure what to think of Marshall’s role. Under
the headline “Negroes’ Lawyer on World Stage,” the New York
Times put it this way: “The fast-talking 51-year-old lawyer has argued
for Negroes’ rights in the United States for a quarter of a century.
Now he is testing his talents on the larger stage of the Negro’s rights
in Africa.”93 According to the paper, Marshall’s reasons for assisting
the Kenyans were three:
1.

There has been a growing awareness of African problems in
the United States over the last five years or so.

2.

Africa is providing opportunities for expansion and
international contacts for Negro business men.

3.

Mr. Marshall had never been to Africa before.

94

89. Id. at 444–45. Marshall loved to tell stories, and it is likely that he massaged this
narrative a bit for dramatic effect; however, the underlying facts of his exclusion from the
meeting are supported by other sources. See Amconsul Nairobi to Dep’t of State, Despatch no.
349, supra note 85 (stating that the district commissioner refused to admit Marshall because “his
name was not on the list of persons scheduled for attendance”). On Marshall as a storyteller, see
David B. Wilkins, Justice as Narrative: Some Personal Reflections on a Master Storyteller, 6
HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 68 (1989).
90. Amconsul Nairobi to Dep’t of State, Despatch no. 349, supra note 85.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Negroes’ Lawyer on World Stage, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1960, at 2.
94. Id.
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“I had always meant to go,” he said in an interview, “but never got
95
around to it. I was always too busy.”

Tom Mboya in London for the Lancaster House Conference on the Kenya
Constitution, January 1960. © Corbis.

95.

Id.
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Marshall seems not to have prejudged the Kenya context prior to
meeting with the nationalists in Kenya. When asked by a reporter
upon his arrival whether he supported universal suffrage for Kenya,
Marshall demurred and said, “I have got to have a look around.”96 He
planned to meet as well with Asian community leaders in Nairobi.97
Marshall understood that Kenya had reached a critical juncture:
“[T]hese people have had it,” he wrote to his wife, “and they are not
going to take any more.”98
Marshall soon left Kenya for London and the Lancaster House
Conference on the Kenya Constitution.99 He would be the only
person present who was not British or Kenyan. Marshall’s role, as the
Cleveland Call and Post reported it, was “to write a tricky constitution
that will give the Africans in Kenya complete political power on the
basis of a democratically elected government by universal franchise,
while protecting the rights of the white minorities which is
outnumbered about 100 to one.”100
The Kenya Constitutional Conference would get off to a rocky
start, with a dispute over advisors. Four delegations were present at
Lancaster House in London. As Marshall described them, his
delegation “was made up of all native African men born in Kenya.”101
A second one, representing the New Kenya Group, was mixed. “It

96. U.S. Negro Leader Arrives in Kenya, supra note 80. Although Marshall may have
simply intended to be cautious before committing to a position on the constitution, this
comment apparently disturbed some nationalists who planned to push for universal adult
suffrage. GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 60, at 133.
97. U.S. Negro Leader Arrives in Kenya, supra note 80.
98. Negroes’ Lawyer on World Stage, supra note 93.
99. Marshall indicated that prior to his work on the Kenyan constitution he had “helped a
little” with the Nigerian constitution. Marshall, supra note 1, at 450. He told an interviewer that
he was unable to provide details due to State Department restrictions. Id. at 451.
100. Thurgood Freezes as Kenyans Feud, supra note 2. LDF attorney Jack Greenberg
recalled that he “helped out by doing research on British Commonwealth constitutions, which I
passed on to [Marshall],” however his recollection was that LDF staff had not drafted anything.
JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS
FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 223 (1994); E-mail from Jack Greenberg to
Mary Dudziak (May 13, 2002) (on file with the author).
101. Marshall, supra note 1, at 445. There was only one group of nationalists at this meeting,
and differences among tribes did not figure prominently in the debates. For this reason, this
Article does not take up the important issue of tribal differences and their impact on
independence politics. These issues would be of great importance at the 1962 Lancaster House
Conference. By that point nationalist politics had formally fractured into two competing parties
(KANU and KADU), and nationalists were split between two different delegations to the
conference. See KYLE, supra note 65, at 115–18 (describing the emergence of the KANU and
KADU).
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had Africans, it had white British, it had Indians, all mixed
102
together.” A third delegation was Asian Indians, a major minority
group in Kenya.103 The fourth delegation representing the United
Party, was all white, and as Marshall described it, “[T]he best way I
can explain them is that if you compared them to the Ku Klux Klan in
its heyday in this country, the Ku Klux Klan would look like a Sunday
104
School picnic. These were real rabid, awful.”
Initially the British were a bit apprehensive about Marshall’s
attendance. The British Colonial Office had expressed to the U.S.
Embassy in London a “tinge of apprehension” about his
appointment, and “expressed [the] hope [that] Marshall had
105
Commonwealth constitutional experience.” Ultimately, however,
the Colonial Secretary concluded that he “had no objection to
Thurgood Marshall as [a] special adviser.”106 Other British observers
were not so sanguine. One man wrote a letter of protest to Colonial
Secretary Ian Macleod. He was “surprised and astounded” to see an
announcement of Marshall’s role in the British press. He urged
107
Macleod to “arrange for this to be stopped.” Marshall was “leader
of America’s National Association for the Advancement of Coloured
People.” The writer was “informed on good authority that this
organisation is largely run by Communists and it is known to have
stirred up trouble against Britain in many parts of Africa. Surely the
British Government cannot permit such an unwise and disgraceful
arrangement for legal advice to be used at our Conference on East
Africa and Kenya here in London.”108
Robert Ruark, in a New York World-Telegram column, agreed,
arguing that the conference was “none of America’s interest, and . . .
certainly . . . none of Mr Marshall’s business.” Marshall’s work was
109
“meddling of the highest order.” But New York Post columnist
Murray Kempton saw it differently. He thought that Marshall’s
102. Marshall, supra note 1, at 445.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Amembassy London to Sec’y of State, Telegram no. 555, supra note 58.
106. London to Sec’y of State, Telegram no. 3552 (Jan. 18, 1960), Records of the
Department of State, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1960–63, 745R.00/1-1860, National Archives.
107. Saullers [illegible] to Macleod (Jan. 12, 1960), Folder: Kenya Constitutional
Conference, 1960 Miscellaneous Representations, CO 822/2349, The National Archives of the
United Kingdom, Public Records Office, Kew, England.
108. Id. (emphasis in original).
109. Robert C. Ruark, Hits Marshall’s Role in Kenya Negotiations, N.Y. WORLDTELEGRAM, Feb. 3, 1960.
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presence at the Lancaster House conference was “one of the most
extraordinary events in colonial history. . . . There seems to be no
record in diplomatic history of a private citizen of the United States
sitting at a British government conference whose subject is Crown
110
colonial policy.” Kempton thought that there was
romance in the image of Thurgood Marshall, the product of
segregated schools, a child in a border city, welcomed as a
distinguished American lawyer by a British Colonial Secretary.
He represents the only revolutionary force that we have constructed
111
in this century and it is suitable for export all over the world.

The politics of the conference quickly became complicated. The
Africans announced that they sought two advisors at the meeting,
Thurgood Marshall and Peter Mbui Koinange.112 The nationalists
were in an awkward position without Kenyatta present. They had
taken the position that they should not collaborate with the colonial
government, but instead insist on Kenyatta’s release as a condition of
any sort of collaboration. Their very presence at Lancaster House
without Kenyatta therefore raised questions among some Kenyans at
home. Koinange, a nationalist in exile, could provide the group with
needed legitimacy, since he shared with Kenyatta having been
associated by the British with the Mau Mau and therefore cast
outside what the British considered to be an acceptable political
community. There was as well an element of personal rivalry.
Mboya’s rival, Oginga Odinga, thought that involving Marshall “gave
United States’ circles a foot in the door of the conference,” and he
was “not happy about it.” This was just one of Mboya’s unilateral
moves related to the Lancaster House conference, and his tendency
to go it alone generated tension and resentment within the group.113
The British government barred Koinange from the meeting,
calling him “one of the only two men outside Kenya regarded by the
Government of Kenya as responsible for the unhappy events that led
114
to the Emergency in Kenya.” This decision led the African Elected
110. Murray Kempton, The Diplomat, N.Y. POST, Jan. 26, 1960, at 24.
111. Id.
112. GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 60, at 133.
113. Id. at 133–36; OGINGA ODINGA, NOT YET UHURU: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
OGINGA ODINGA 177 (1967).
114. Record of Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1st plen. sess. (Jan. 18, 1960), Folder:
Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1960, Record of Plenary Meetings, CO 822/2358, The

01__DUDZIAK.DOC

748

1/11/2007 10:44 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:721

Members to boycott the conference. As an American newspaper put
it, the Africans had given in to “the whites on [the Africans’]
insistence that Jomo Kenyetta [sic], convicted and exiled on a charge
of leading the Mau Mau terrorists in 1952, as one of their
115
Thurgood Marshall explained that, having
delegation.”
compromised on Kenyatta, the Africans thought they needed
Koinange as an African “elder statesman.” If the Africans gave in to
objections to Koinange’s role, Marshall told the paper, “the people
back home will accuse them of selling out and any agreement they
make at the conference will be regarded with suspicion.”116
Because of these developments, the Lancaster House
Conference began without the Africans present, and without
Thurgood Marshall. According to the U.S. Embassy, “Macleod hoped
[that] African-elected members ‘having made protest . . . will join our
117
discussions . . . which are so important to [the] future of Kenya.”
Ultimately, the controversy over Koinange led the British to
embrace Marshall. Macleod called him “a very distinguished lawyer
118
and one whom we will be very glad to see at our Conference.”
Koinange, in contrast, was regarded by the British as tainted by Mau
119
Mau ties, and hence unacceptable.
Macleod was sorry to have to proceed without the Africans. In
his opening statement, he said “It is to my great regret . . . that we are
120
meeting at this moment with an incomplete Conference.” Macleod
set out the ultimate objective of Kenya negotiations: “[W]e intend to
lead Kenya on to enjoy full self-government, or if I may use a plainer
word, Independence.”121 This was the ultimate goal, but not the focus
of the 1960 conference. Instead, “our task is to plan the next step in
Kenya’s constitutional evolution. To see at what pace Kenya can
assume greater responsibility for the conduct of her own affairs.”122 As

National Archives of the United Kingdom, Public Records Office, Kew, England; accord
London to Sec’y of State, Telegram no. 3552, supra note 106.
115. Thurgood Freezes as Kenyans Feud, supra note 2.
116. Id.
117. London to Sec’y of State, Telegram no. 3552, supra note 106 (omission of closed quote
in original).
118. Record of Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1st plen. sess., supra note 114.
119. Id.
120. Id.; accord London to Sec’y of State, Telegram no. 3551 (Jan. 18, 1960), Records of the
Department of State, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1960–63, 745R.00/1-1860, National Archives.
121. Record of Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1st plen. sess., supra note 114.
122. Id.
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conferees worked, Macleod emphasized, “we should remember that
both Africans are easily the majority of all the people of Kenya and
also that all those who have made their homes in Kenya are entitled
123
to make a full contribution to the work of governing their country.”
So Macleod set out the central problem underlying the constitutional
talks: the issue of political enfranchisement of the majority without
the sacrifice of minority rights. This dynamic created problems that
“have to be solved before Kenya can come to independence.”124 The
Secretary emphasized the importance of an inclusive approach to
politics, and that, “for the time being . . . the interests of minorities
might have to be secured through constitutional safeguards.”125 He
proposed three committees for the conference: a committee on the
Council of Ministers, a committee on the franchise and the colonial
legislature, and a committee on a bill of rights.126
As the conference got underway, Marshall, unable to attend the
meeting due to the boycott, instead spoke to the press. He warned of
the serious consequences for Kenya if an agreement acceptable to the
Africans on Kenya’s constitution was not reached. Marshall warned
of “a new uprising in Kenya that nobody can control—any more than
127
they could control Mau Mau.” He was afraid that “a revolt might
occur if the constitutional conference meeting ended with what the
Kenyans considered to be an ‘imposed’ constitution. ‘This new group
throughout Africa know exacly [sic] what they want,’ Mr. Marshall
was quoted as saying. ‘They want independence now—tomorrow is
too late.’”128 As the East African Standard reported it, “Mr. Marshall
spoke of his hopes for a common-roll democracy, with a constitution
providing for minority safeguards and an effective Bill of Rights. ‘The
123. Id.
124. Id. At this point, some British leaders believed that Kenya might become independent
in about fifteen years.
The U.S. position was that it “supports [the] principle [of] orderly transition to selfgovernment and eventual self-determination in [the] interest [of] all parties and peoples
involved.” According to the American position, “all people permanently resident in Africa have
legitimate interests for which they can rightfully demand fair and just consideration.” Nairobi to
Sec’y of State, Telegram no. 262 (Feb. 2, 1960), Records of the Department of State, RG 59,
Central Decimal File, 1960–63, 745R.00/2-260, National Archives.
125. Record of Kenya Constitutional Conference, 2nd plen. sess. (Jan. 20, 1960), Folder:
Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1960, Record of Plenary Meetings, CO 822/2358, The
National Archives of the United Kingdom, Public Records Office, Kew, England.
126. Id.
127. Kikuyu Protest at Second Advisor: Telegram from Loyalists Sent to Mr. Macleod, E.
AFRICAN STANDARD, Jan. 25, 1960, at 5.
128. Id.
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most important thing is that we protect property so that no future
Government of Kenya can seize the land in the Highlands,’ he
129
added.” The story continued:
The central fact of Kenya’s political future, in Mr. Marshall’s view,
was that there are 6,000,000 Africans as compared with 64,000
Europeans, 165,000 Asians and 35,000 Arabs. What was more, the
Europeans had made little effort to learn the Swahili language or
otherwise adapt themselves to the culture of their adopted
130
country.

According to the East African Standard, Marshall was “working
on a ‘Draft bill of Rights,’” which the African Elected Members
131
“propose to submit to the conference.”
The indications are that their case is based on the following
points: . . . . Welcome for common roll elections; one adult, one vote;
a demand for nine elected Ministers, including the Chief Minister;
single-member constituencies, based geographically; perhaps three
Civil Service Ministers for a transitional period; opposition to high
qualifications for the franchise as a safeguard for minorities; no
franchise on racial grounds; Africans willing to accept responsibility
in the Government; reserved seats definitely unsatisfactory; and a
132
national Parliament instead of the Legislative Council.

Marshall’s task would be complicated, however, for the draft Bill of
Rights would become a pivotal issue at the 1960 Lancaster House
Conference.

129.
130.

Id.
Id.
The bill of rights and especially property rights were key issues at this conference.
Another important issue that would be a focus of discussion later on would be citizenship, and
the question of whether whites and Asians would become citizens of Kenya. Tom Mboya
addressed this issue in a speech to white farmers in 1962. He encouraged them to stay in the new
nation. However, “[o]n the attainment of our independence all who were formerly ‘nonAfricans’ must become full citizens of Kenya. . . . But if you are not prepared to be citizens of
Kenya, there will be no place for you here, except as aliens.” TOM MBOYA, Kenya as a Nation,
Address to Members of the Kenya National Farmers’ Union (July 23, 1962), in THE
CHALLENGE OF NATIONHOOD 40, 46 (1970). The 1963 Independence Constitution enabled
whites and Asians to become citizens by registration within two years. After that they could
only become citizens through naturalization, which required knowledge of Swahili. The
constitution also expressly exempted noncitizens from protection against discrimination.
CONSTITUTION, Ch. I–II (1963) (Kenya), available at http://www.4cskenyatuitakayo.org/
downloads/1963Constitution.pdf.
131. Optimism Prevails in London, E. AFRICAN STANDARD, Jan. 25, 1960, at 1.
132. Id.

01__DUDZIAK.DOC

2006]

1/11/2007 10:44 AM

WORKING TOWARD DEMOCRACY

751

Finally, according to the Ghana Times, “The Kenya Nationalists
stood their ground and boycotted the conference till the Colonial
Secretary, perhaps, realised that a Kenya conference without the
133
accredited leaders of Kenya was like Hamlet without the prince.”
Macleod brokered a compromise. Each delegation would be entitled
to one adviser in attendance at the sessions in Lancaster House.
Other advisers, including Koinange, could be present in the building,
but could not attend sessions. Because of this deal, the African
delegation’s sole advisor to be present at the sessions would be
Thurgood Marshall.134 Macleod was now pleased with Marshall’s
presence, for without him as an alternative advisor to Koinange, the
elements making this compromise possible would be missing. As the
U.S. Embassy in London put it, Marshall “appears to be persona
grata coloff . . . . (Without Marshall as alternative to Koinange ColSec
would have been unable [to] apply [the] formula re attendance [of]
advisers which permitted [the] conference [to] get underway this
week.).”135
Marshall’s role also registered back at home. On January 28,
Secretary of State Christian Herter cabled the U.S. Embassy in
London for information. In “[v]iew [of the] wide press coverage and
participation [by] Marshall,” he said, the State Department would
“appreciate Embassy comment, [and] analysis [of the] Kenya
136
conference.” The U.S. Embassy kept track of Marshall’s work, and
137
reported on his activities to the Secretary of State.

133. J.G. Amamoo, London Letter: Kenya’s Future, GHANA TIMES, Feb. 2, 1960, at 8.
Macleod had been responding to pressure from white settlers, the paper speculated. To the
settler representative in London, “recognition of Mr. Koinange, in any form, whatsoever, is an
anathema; and the very mention of the man’s name, is said to cause the blood-pressure of
certain people to shoot up.” The Ghana Times, the principal paper of a nation that achieved
independence in 1957, was not sympathetic: “Well, these people, with all respect, will have to be
told that the rising tide of nationalism in Africa is a fact which cannot be denied or ignored, and
that it is more prudent to swim with the tide than against it.” Id.
134. London to Sec’y of State, Telegram no. 3666 (Jan. 23, 1960), Records of the
Department of State, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1960–63, 745R.00/1-2360, National Archives.
135. London to Sec’y of State, Telegram no. 3782 (Jan. 29, 1960), Records of the
Department of State, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1960–63, 745R.00/1-2960, National Archives.
According to the Embassy, “As adviser Marshall does not speak in [the] conference. While he
has been mentioned in [the] press on several occasions, he has not become [a] subject of
controversy.” Id.
136. Dep’t of State to Amembassy London, Telegram no. 5700 (Jan. 28, 1960), Records of
the Department of State, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1960–63, 745R.00/1-2860, National
Archives.
137. E.g., London to Sec’y of State, Telegram no. 3782, supra note 135.
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III. WRITING RIGHTS
The meetings at Lancaster House were not pleasant. As Marshall
put it, “[e]verybody was at everybody’s throat.”138 There was a rough
consensus, however, on what mattered most: the central issue of
voting rights and representation in the legislature. British support for
majority African voting rights meant that progress on that issue came
sooner than participants had expected. With majority representation
possible for Africans, another matter became central: safeguards, or a
bill of rights, to protect the interests of the powerful who were soon to
become an electoral minority. Reacting to Macleod’s opening
statement, speaker after speaker emphasized the importance of
“safeguards” to protect minority rights as Africans gained political
power.139
For the African Elected Members, Ronald Ngala emphasized the
importance of moving to democratic self governance soon. Delay, he
140
Minority rights should be
suggested “would be disastrous.”
protected, but not through reserved seats for racial groups in the
legislature, as was the case in 1960. Instead, “the best form of
safeguard for all races in Kenya was a Bill of Rights enforced by an
141
independent judiciary.” He announced that Marshall, “an expert on
minorities and civil rights, had been retained by the African
Constituency Elected Members and was drafting a proposed Bill of
Civil Rights.”142 The Africans repeatedly emphasized that a bill of
rights, rather than reserved seats in the legislature, was the ideal way
to protect minority rights. This had been a longstanding position,
argued Dr. Julius Kiano, and was not “developed merely to quiet the
fears of those who were afraid of African domination.”143 Oginga
Odinga had included a call for complete equality in a 1957 election
manifesto, and in 1958, the African Elected Members circulated a
memorandum pledging support for a bill of rights. Kiano stressed that

138. Marshall, supra note 1, at 445.
139. Record of Kenya Constitutional Conference, 4th plen. sess. (Jan. 25, 1960), Folder:
Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1960, Record of Plenary Meetings, CO 822/2358, The
National Archives of the United Kingdom, Public Records Office, Kew, England.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Record of Kenya Constitutional Conference, 6th plen. sess. (Jan. 26, 1960), Folder:
Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1960, Record of Plenary Meetings, CO 822/2358, The
National Archives of the United Kingdom, Public Records Office, Kew, England.
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Africans intended that an independent Kenya should subscribe to the
144
Convention on Human Rights.
Michael Blundell of the multiracial New Kenya Group disagreed
about reserved seats in the legislature for racial groups, but he agreed
that individual rights must be protected in the new constitution, and
145
he stressed as well the importance of an independent judiciary. Dr.
S.G. Hassan, leader of the Asian delegation, emphasized the
importance of Asians to economic progress in Kenya. The Asians and
Muslims supported independence and majority rule in Kenya, but
Hassan urged that the fundamental human rights of their groups must
be protected.146
For their part, members of the all-white United Party stressed
not voting rights, but broader education, and argued that full
enfranchisement of Africans would have to wait for some time until
more Africans had been educated.147 United Party leader L.R. Briggs
described the concerns of white settlers in a B.B.C. interview.
According to news accounts, “Briggs said his party was afraid that if
Africans had control they would make it ‘virtually impossible’ to
farm, either by taxation or by political pressures.”148 He emphasized:
“Our feeling is that if a constitution were introduced which would
have the effect of placing the Europeans under the dictatorship of the
Africans, then we would naturally wish to enable our people to leave
149
the country if they wished to do so.”
Although all conference participants thought that rights were
important, a bill of rights was always a second-best source of
protection for minority interests. The Secretary of State hoped that a
gradual transition in Kenya would provide time for the races to work
together: “This should help to generate mutual goodwill, respect and
understanding, which will afford more lasting assurance of European
150
position than any constitutional safeguards.”
Days of opening statements were accompanied by nights of
behind-the-scenes negotiations. Discussions between groups and with
144. Id.
145. Record of Kenya Constitutional Conference, 4th plen. sess., supra note 139.
146. Id.
147. Record of Kenya Constitutional Conference, 6th plen. sess., supra note 143.
148. Kenya Talks: Capt. Briggs Afraid of African Majority, GHANA TIMES, Feb. 8, 1960, at 9.
149. Id.
150. Sec’y of State for the Colonies to Kenya (O.A.G.), Telegram no. 30 (Feb. 15, 1960),
Folder: Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1960, Record of Proceedings, CO 822/2354, The
National Archives of the United Kingdom, Public Records Office, Kew, England.
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the Colonial Secretary were productive, and the conference quickly
agreed on a new plan for suffrage and representation. According to
B.A. Ogot, a new Legislative Council would consist of thirty-three
members elected for the first time to open (non-racially designated)
seats. The remaining seats in the legislature would be reserved for
minority groups: “ten for Europeans, eight for Asians and two for
151
Arabs.” At the conference, “[f]or the first time the British
Government conceded the principle of African majority rule in
Kenya.”
In a statement for the press, the Secretary of State for the
Colonies expressed his pleasure with the progress made at the
conference. “I am very happy with the measure of agreement that the
Lancaster House Conference has revealed,” he said. “In Kenya the
groups mainly concerned had taken up positions which it seemed
impossible to reconcile. Here in London, by talking out their
differences together, they have come much closer to each other.”152
He felt that there was “a good chance that the wide measure of
agreement for which I have always sought will now be obtained.” It
was only the United Party that “stand[s] out completely against [the
proposals] and even they are anxious to join in the further discussions
of the Conference.”153
The Commonwealth Relations Office noted that the
“[c]onference has shown greater co-operation and agreement among
154
all groups than ever before.” In particular, the “New Kenya Group
has shown great political courage in going beyond views of many
155
supporters (of all races, but particularly of European community).”
The question remaining, of course, was whether the positions taken
by representatives at the conference would be palatable to their
constituencies back in Kenya. “Next week’s political meetings in
Kenya will show whether moderates can survive . . . .”156

151. Ogot, supra note 69, at 61.
152. Sec’y of State for the Colonies to Kenya (O.A.G.), Telegram no. 150 (Feb. 16, 1960),
Folder: Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1960, Record of Proceedings, CO 822/2354, The
National Archives of the United Kingdom, Public Records Office, Kew, England.
153. Id.
154. Commonwealth Relations Office to Ottawa and Others, Telegram no. 75 (Feb. 16,
1960), Folder: Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1960, Record of Proceedings, CO 822/2354,
The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Public Records Office, Kew, England.
155. Id.
156. Id.

01__DUDZIAK.DOC

2006]

1/11/2007 10:44 AM

WORKING TOWARD DEMOCRACY

755

The New Kenya Group agreed to the proposals “provided
157
reasonable agreement is reached on the safeguards.” Much hope
was put in the New Kenya Group, as a “rallying point for moderate
158
Africans and as a means of bringing round European opinion.”
Government officials hoped that “they may well be able to form an
effective sandbag against African extremism.”159 Meanwhile, back in
Kenya, the Acting Governor reported that European opinion was
160
coalescing behind the United Party.
An agreement leading to majority rule in Kenya put Marshall’s
work front and center, for Marshall’s contribution to the conference
161
was a draft Schedule of Rights. On February 2, 1960, Marshall
submitted a memorandum on a draft Bill of Rights to the Committee
162
on Safeguards at the Lancaster House Conference. There is a
puzzling note in Marshall’s memo. Although he was serving as an
advisor to the African Elected Members, Marshall submitted his
memorandum on behalf of himself alone. “This proposal is solely
mine,” he wrote, “and has neither been discussed with nor approved

157. Ian Macleod to Prime Minister, P.M. (60) 7 (Feb. 17, 1960), Folder: Kenya
Constitutional Conference, 1960, Record of Proceedings, CO 822/2354, The National Archives
of the United Kingdom, Public Records Office, Kew, England.
158. Draft Note for the Prime Minister, Folder: Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1960,
Record of Proceedings, CO 822/2354, The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Public
Records Office, Kew, England.
159. Id.
160. Kenya (Acting Governor) to Secretary of State for the Colonies, Telegram 193 (Feb.
17, 1960), CO 822/2356, Folder: Kenya Constitutional Conference 1960, Reactions in Kenya,
The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Public Records Office, Kew, England; Kenya
(Acting Governor) to Secretary of State for the Colonies, Telegram 176 (Feb. 12, 1960), CO
822/2356, Folder: Kenya Constitutional Conference 1960, Reactions in Kenya, The National
Archives of the United Kingdom, Public Records Office, Kew, England.
161. As Marshall recalled:
I wrote the whole “schedule” of rights, as they call it in Britain. I said it was a
schedule. The Britishers said, it’s their language, they knew what they were talking
about, and the correct pronunciation was “shedule.” I said, “Well, if that’s true, how
are your children doing in shul today?”—but it still came down as a shedule.
Marshall, supra note 1, at 445–46. Three papers on a bill of rights were circulated at the
conference: one by Thurgood Marshall, one by Colonial Office Advisor W.J. M. Mackensie, and
one based on the Nigerian constitution. Land Tenure and Bill of Rights: Kenya Whites Seek to
Perpetuate Evil, GHANA TIMES, Feb. 20, 1960, at 4. The Ghana Times reported that “another
document covering the best features of all three had been prepared by Dr. Marshall and had
been accepted in its general terms by all delegates.” Id.
162. Proposed Draft Bill of Rights, attachment to J.A. Sankey and T.M. Heiser, Note by the
Secretaries (Feb. 2, 1960), Folder: Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1960 Committee on
Safeguards, Memoranda, CO 822/2362, The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Public
Records Office, Kew, England.
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or rejected by the African Elected Members or any other group. It is,
163
therefore, submitted for use by all members of the Conference.”
The reason that Marshall submitted the memorandum on his
own, and without previously discussing it with the African Elected
Members, is not disclosed in archival records or press accounts. It
may simply have been a matter of timing, since Marshall’s work in
London was cut short when he received an urgent call to return home
due to developments in the civil rights movement in the United
States. In addition, the nationalists were tied up in negotiations
leading to a compromise on representation and suffrage. Besides their
behind-the-scenes work on these matters, press interviews and
meetings among themselves on various matters were priorities early
in the conference. The Bill of Rights also raised many complicated
issues which the group would not have had time to consider fully. It is
unlikely that the note reveals differences between Marshall and the
African delegates, and that this undermined their ability to work
together. Marshall was remembered very warmly afterward.164 There
is an ambiguous suggestion of the possibility of conflict, however, in
the records. After Marshall’s departure later that month, according to
press reports, Mboya’s chief rival Oginga Odinga was “reported
denying rumours of clash between A.E.M. and Thurgood
Marshall,”165 but the British press often played up the possibility of
divisions, whether or not they existed. Marshall’s sole authorship
cannot shed much light on the nationalists’ views about rights as of
the 1960 Lancaster House Conference, but it provides a better

163. Id.
164. Tom Mboya to Thurgood Marshall (Mar. 25, 1960), Folder: 25.6, General
Correspondence with Foreign Countries, Correspondence with USA, Volume one (For/1/v. 1),
1960, March-April, Box 25, Tom Mboya Papers, Hoover Institution; Harry Kreisler, Kenyan
Independence: The Early Years: Conversation with Julius Kiano (Sept. 14, 1989)
http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/Kiano/kiano2.html.
165. Kenya (Dir. of Info.) to Sec’y of State for the Colonies, Telegram no. 53160 (Feb. 6,
1960), Folder: Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1960, Record of Proceedings, CO 822/2354,
The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Public Records Office, Kew, England.
“A.E.M.” stood for African Elected Members. See also ODINGA, supra note 113, at 177.
The possibility that Marshall fell out of favor with the nationalists is undercut by the fact
that he was mentioned as a possible advisor by both competing nationalist groups for the 1962
Lancaster House Conference, and one of the two groups, KANU, included Marshall’s draft Bill
of Rights in their constitutional demands. Nairobi to Sec’y of State, Airgram no. 60 (Nov. 28,
1961), Records of the Department of State, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1960–63, 745R.03/112861, National Archives. Marshall’s appointment to the Second Circuit made him unavailable to
serve.
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window into Marshall’s thinking than a consensus document would
have provided.
Marshall explained his objectives at a Committee on Safeguards
meeting later that month. He said that “the intention of his paper . . .
was to protect the rights of every individual in Kenya, rather than the
166
rights of any particular minority groups.” The proposed Bill of
Rights began with a preamble: “All persons are equal before the law
and are entitled without any disorimination [sic] or distinction of any
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, to
equal protection of the law.”167 Marshall thought that the preamble
would “help the Courts when interpreting the particular provisions of
the Bill by setting out general principles on which it would be
based.”168
Section I protected the rights of “Freedom of Religion, Speech,
Press and Association.”169 Section II on “Personal Security”170
protected rights to life and liberty, rights against slavery, and the right
to equal protection of the law. Section III guaranteed rights to
“Education, Health and Welfare,”171 Section IV protected the “Right
172
173
to Work,” and Section V protected voting rights. Sections I, II and
V paralleled in many ways the U.S. Constitution, but Sections III and
IV differed, at least from the U.S. text. Section III on “Education,
Health and Welfare,” and Section IV on the “Right to Work,”
protected affirmative rights to education, to employment, and to what
now would be called a “living wage.”174 Section IV provided that
“[e]veryone who works has the right to just and favourable
166. Kenya Constitutional Conference, Comm. on Safeguards, 1st mtg. (Feb. 16, 1960),
Folder: Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1960, Committee on Safeguards, Record of Meetings,
CO 822/2363, The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Public Records Office, Kew,
England. Minutes from the meeting summarized Marshall’s comments, so some passages may
be paraphrases of Marshall, and not all quotes are verbatim.
167. Proposed Draft Bill of Rights, attachment to J.A. Sankey and T.M. Heiser, Note by the
Secretaries, supra note 162.
168. Kenya Constitutional Conference, Comm. on Safeguards, 1st mtg., supra note 166.
169. Proposed Draft Bill of Rights, attachment to J.A. Sankey and T.M. Heiser, Note by the
Secretaries, supra note 162.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. On the right to a “living wage,” see generally MaryBeth Lipp, Legislators’ Obligation to
Support a Living Wage: A Comparative Constitutional Vision of Justice, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 475
(2002).
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remuneration insuring for himself and his family an existence worthy
of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of
175
social protection.” The right to work also protected the right “to
176
form and to join trade unions.” Marshall said that his draft drew
upon provisions from the U.S. Constitution, the Malayan Bill of
Rights, and the Constitution of Nigeria.177 The language of the right to
work clause does not parallel provisions of these constitutions,
however, and instead tracks the language of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.178
The key section of the Bill of Rights was Section VI, on
“Property Rights.”179 Here Marshall recommended that provisions of
the Nigerian Constitution be adapted to conditions in Kenya, and his
memo simply incorporated the Nigerian text. He relied on the
Nigerian constitution for clauses protecting property rights, because
180
these were “the best he had met.” This section provided, in part:
(1) No property, movable or immovable, shall be taken
possession of compulsorily and no right over or interest in
any such property shall be acquired compulsorily except by
or under the provisions of a law which, of itself or when
read with any other law in force—
(a)

requires the payment of adequate compensation
therefor;

(b)

gives to any person claiming such compensation a
right of access, for the determination of his interest in
the property and the amount of compensation, to the
Courts;

(c)

gives to any party to proceedings in the Court relating

175. Proposed Draft Bill of Rights, attachment to J.A. Sankey and T.M. Heiser, Note by the
Secretaries, supra note 162.
176. Id. Although Marshall’s proposal included voting rights protection, he does not appear
to have participated directly in debates over the franchise at the conference. The voting rights
section of his proposal does not appear to have been a topic of debate.
177. Kenya Constitutional Conference, Comm. on Safeguards, 1st mtg., supra note 166.
178. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 75, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). Thanks to Renee Rastorfer for tracking this
down, and also to Naseem Sagati for her helpful work on this topic.
179. Proposed Draft Bill of Rights, attachment to J.A. Sankey and T.M. Heiser, Note by the
Secretaries, supra note 162.
180. Kenya Constitutional Conference, Comm. on Safeguards, 1st mtg., supra note 166.
Marshall suggested that the Conference should agree on general principles, with detailed
drafting to be carried out later. Id.
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to such a claim the same rights of appeal as are
accorded generally to parties to civil proceedings in
181
that Court sitting as a court of original jurisdiction.

A “taking” could only be for public purposes, and this section of the
Bill of Rights incorporated that idea through a reference to
182
previously existing statutes. This proposal would ultimately be
modified to include a right to take a dispute over a taking of property
directly to the highest court in Kenya.183 Allowing the government to
take property seemed to leave open the option of land reform, while
the requirement of compensation was principally aimed to protect
white minority settlers from government abuse.
The fairly straightforward language of this takings clause masked
a deep underlying division at the Kenya Constitutional Conference, a
fissure that ran through independence politics in the Colony. The
most valuable land in Kenya had originally been tribal land, and now
was exclusively in the hands of white settlers. These farmers produced
Kenya’s agricultural exports, and so were the principal tie with global
markets. The settler community believed that the land belonged to
them, and that their property rights must be protected. Many
nationalists believed that a key objective of a postcolonial
government must be land reform and resettlement. Land reform
would redress a historical injustice of displacement of African peoples
from their lands under colonialism. For the British, contemplating a
continuing relationship with Kenya as part of the Commonwealth,
and hoping to protect British citizens who had settled in Kenya, any

181. Proposed Draft Bill of Rights, attachment to J.A. Sankey and T.M. Heiser, Note by the
Secretaries, supra note 162.
182. Subsection Two of Section VI of the Bill of Rights provided that “[n]othing in this
section shall affect the operation of any existing law,” including subsequent amendments to
existing law which did not “add to the kinds of property that may be taken possession of” or “to
the purposes for which or circumstances in which such property may be taken possession of or
acquired”; “make the conditions governing entitlement to any compensation or the amount
thereof less favourable”; or deprive a person of the rights guaranteed in this section of the
constitution. Id. In this way, the constitution would constrain future lawmaking affecting
property rights, without immediately unsettling the entire statutory framework the country was
based on. This kind of limitation was common in African constitutions written during this
period.
183. Because there was only a tiny number of indigenous Africans in Kenya who were
lawyers, this meant that property disputes would ultimately be resolved in most cases by
Europeans. Marshall was aware of this issue and hence was concerned that Kenyans needed to
be trained as lawyers. See Marshall, supra note 1, at 446 (noting lack of African judges). On
courts in East Africa, see generally JENNIFER WIDNER, BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW: FRANCIS
NYALAI AND THE ROAD TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AFRICA (2001).
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resettlement scheme must not interfere with settler property rights,
184
and so must be based on just compensation.
An argument broke out in committee: what “public purposes”
could the government take land for? Some white settlers wanted this
spelled out very clearly. But to do that would seem to require the
Africans to develop a policy on land reform on the spot—something
they had not contemplated, and were not in a position to do. Mr.
Slade, a white settler with the New Kenya Party, thought that even if
compensation was provided, “the right of the state to expropriate
land should be restricted to public purposes, and that some definition
of ‘public purposes’, even if it were a negative one, should be included
185
in the Bill of Rights.” Seeing this as an attempt to tie the hands of a
future government, nationalists objected. Ronald Ngala believed that
“the acquisition of unused land for distribution to the landless of all
races should come within the interpretation of ‘public purposes,’”186
while Tom Mboya suggested that
the Bill of Rights should not entrench the position of those enjoying
a privileged position, nor perpetuate a system that was basically
unjust. It should be within the power of the Government of Kenya
to bring in legislation to remove injustices. The Courts should be left
to interpret “public purposes” in the light of changing
187
circumstances.

This issue would drive a wedge between groups at the
conference, threatening the consensus Colonial Secretary Macleod
had hoped for. “We are bogged down over [s]afeguards,” the
Secretary of State’s office reported to the Colonial Governor’s office.
“Conference pretty well agreed there should be a Bill of Rights . . .
largely based on Nigerian model. But hitch came, when we got on to
property rights.”188 Macleod told the Prime Minister:

184. A land buy-out scheme was in place by 1963, with British and World Bank financing.
This was directed principally at agricultural land held by white settlers, rather than commercial
properties owned by Asians. See KYLE, supra note 65, at 152–58 (noting the various settlement
schemes implemented as Kenyan independence became apparent and white settlers wished to
leave); Ogot, supra note 69, at 64 (discussing 1960s land settlement).
185. Kenya Constitutional Conference, Comm. on Safeguards, 1st mtg., supra note 166.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Sec’y of State for the Colonies to Kenya (O.A.G.), Telegram no. 34 (Feb. 18, 1960),
Folder: Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1960, Record of Proceedings, CO 822/2354, The
National Archives of the United Kingdom, Public Records Office, Kew, England.
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The New Kenya Party made their acceptance of the constitutional
settlement conditional on reasonable proposals for safeguards, and
by that they mean largely land. . . . The Africans don’t like it at all
and are very resentful of the Europeans for raising the matter when
189
the Africans have already agreed to a Bill of Rights.

They “had not come here to discuss land issues and will not commit
190
themselves to any statement of the kind Slade is obviously after.” A
further wrinkle, Macleod thought, was that “[t]hey are of course very
much divided on the issue themselves.”191 Nevertheless, the Africans
“want an agreement and they want to return soon to Kenya with an
agreement, and so in short although they dislike it very much they are
prepared to accept” a portion of the proposal, but not language
defining and limiting the public purposes for which land could be
confiscated.192 Because of these difficulties, there was “little hope of
concluding business” soon, but the government was nonetheless
“seized of [the] importance of getting people back to Kenya with an
agreement as soon as possible.”193 Meanwhile, the Acting Governor in
Kenya warned: “[A]ll sources report growing unrest amongst
Europeans. We are afraid that a band of hot heads may do something
rash which will spark off a series of racial clashes which will do a good
deal of harm particularly to [the] European community.”194
Ultimately the Committee considered the following language:
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Suggested Formula for Report
[p. 1] In regard to rights in property, the Conference considered
that the Bill of Rights should include provision to the effect:
(i)

that private rights in property of all kinds
should be respected and should not be
compulsorily acquired or extinguished without
full and fair compensation;

189. Ian Macleod to Prime Minister (Feb. 20, 1960), PREM 11/3030, New Constitutional
Arrangements for Kenya, 1957–60, The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Public
Records Office, Kew, England.
190. Sec’y of State for the Colonies to Kenya (O.A.G.), Telegram no. 34, supra note 188.
191. Id.
192. Ian Macleod to Prime Minister, supra note 189.
193. Sec’y of State for the Colonies to Kenya (O.A.G.), Telegram no. 34, supra note 188.
194. Kenya (Acting Governor) to Sec’y of State for the Colonies, Telegram no. 200 (Feb. 19,
1960), Folder: Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1960, Record of Proceedings, CO 822/2354,
The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Public Records Office, Kew, England.
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that any question or dispute as to the property
to be acquired or the compensation to be paid
therefor should be open to judicial
determination by the Courts at the instance of
the person from whom the property is to be
acquired, and that such judicial determination
should be subject to the normal avenues of
judicial appeal in civil cases; and
that compulsory acquisition of property of any
kind should be confined to circumstances in
which such acquisition is required for the
fulfilment of contractual or other legal
obligations attaching to the owner of the
property or circumstances in which such
acquisition is justified in the general public
interest.

[p. 2] The Conference did not however consider that compulsory
acquisition of private rights in property would be “justified in the
general public interest” if the purpose of the acquisition would be to
make the property available to another person or persons for his or
their private advantage unless the property is after acquisition to be
so applied as to be of service to the public outweighing the resultant
hardship to the dispossessed owner.
The Conference considered that the provisions in this regard in
the Nigerian constitution would provide a convenient model for
195
adaptation and modification to these requirements.

The nationalists indicated that they could agree to the first page of
this language, but not to page two, but Slade held out for the
inclusion of page two. Marshall insisted that “he is prepared to stake
his reputation that the words on the second page add nothing to those
196
on the first.”
The central obstacle seemed not to be the New Kenya Party as a
whole, but Slade, who Macleod described as “something of a fanatic,”
who viewed the issue as a matter of principle. Macleod thought that
he might need to bring Slade to see the prime minister, and suggested
that “an appeal to Slade on the wider grounds of the importance of
the Kenya agreement to the whole of Africa, and indeed the whole
195. Right Honourable Viscount Kilmuir [to Macleod?] (Feb. 19, 1960), Folder: Kenya
Constitutional Conference, 1960, Record of Proceedings, CO 822/2354, Record of Proceedings,
The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Public Records Office, Kew, England.
196. Id.
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Commonwealth, would be the only possible way of breaking through
197
his rigid position; reason alone will not do it.” The Africans, in
contrast, were attempting to compromise, and Macleod thought that
they could not go further “or they would be repudiated at home.
Indeed, already they may have gone too far.”198
IV. COMING HOME
Before work on the Kenyan Constitution was complete, a call
from home brought Marshall back from Kenya. Marshall was in
London on February 1, 1960, a historic day in the U.S. civil rights
movement. That day, four African American freshmen at North
Carolina Agricultural and Technical College held a sit-in at the
segregated lunch counter at Woolworth’s in Greensboro, North
Carolina. The simple protest soon expanded into a widespread sit-in
movement. Jack Greenberg recalled,
[I]t was as if a spark had been struck in an oxygen-filled atmosphere.
The sit-ins spontaneously spread to neighboring cities in North
Carolina and within two weeks they were all over the South. Blacks
began demanding nonsegregated service at lunch counters,
department stores, bus terminals, and all the places from which they
had been excluded or segregated; supporters joined them at
199
branches of the offending chain stores in the North as well.

Greenberg would later write that the Legal Defense Fund “set out to
200
defend the students immediately.” But the sit-ins posed a set of
legal and practical dilemmas for civil rights lawyers, among them the
problem that the students had violated facially valid trespass laws, not
facially vulnerable segregation laws. Once Thurgood Marshall
returned to New York, Derrick Bell, then a young lawyer at the LDF,
recalled,
Thurgood stormed around the room proclaiming in a voice that
could be heard across Columbus Circle that he did not care what
anyone said, he was not going to represent a bunch of crazy colored
197.
198.
199.

Ian Macleod to Prime Minister, supra note 189.
Id.
GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS, supra note 100, at 271. See generally
CHAFE, supra note 40 (discussing the history and impact of the Greensboro sit-in
demonstrations). Events like the sit-ins would generate widespread international media
coverage, and sympathetic international reaction. On the international impact of the civil rights
movement, see generally DUDZIAK, supra note 21.
200. GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS, supra note 100, at 272.
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students who violated the sacred property rights of white folks by
going in their stores or lunch counters and refusing to leave when
201
ordered to do so.

He insisted that he would only take the cases if his staff could find
202
some new and convincing arguments. But Marshall later simply
explained in an oral history interview that “when word came over of
the movement of Martin Luther King and the others, and after
several telephone calls with the office in New York, I decided I’d
better come home and take care of home, instead of trying to take
care of Kenya.”203 He finished his work on the constitution, he said,
204
and quickly returned home.
After Marshall departed, meetings continued in London on the
question of safeguards. According to the U.S. Embassy in London,
the “subject [is] not all plain sailing.” The “goal of [the] conference
continues [to] be [a] fairly short set of general principles, which will
form [the] basis of [a] detailed constitution to be drafted later in
205
Nairobi and London.” However, “[t]his highly emotional issue has
apparently postponed conclusion [of the] conference. . . .
[P]articipants [are] searching hard for [a] formula either to resolve or
shelve [the] issue.”206 At the same time, Africans were “getting uneasy
about [the] extent to which they have accepted Colonial office and
Blundell group proposals, for while they recognize [the] merits of
[the] proposals, they worried about [the] reaction of their constituents
in Kenya.”207 As Mboya saw it, some representatives at the conference
“want the bill to contain safeguards on land which would exclude any
future Government from expropriating land with or without
compensation.”208 Mboya said, “We are not prepared to discuss this
question. The bill already safeguards land and property owners within

201. Derrick Bell, An Epistolary Exploration for a Thurgood Marshall Biography, 6 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 51, 55 (1989); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 287 (quoting the same).
202. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 287; see also Bell, supra note 201, at 55 (regarding
Marshall’s concerns about the legal basis for the defense of sit-in protesters).
203. Marshall, supra note 1, at 476.
204. See id. Marshall’s oral history indicates that these events occurred in 1961, however
Marshall worked on the Kenyan constitution in London in 1960.
205. London to Sec’y of State, Telegram no. 4038 (Feb. 16, 1960), Records of the
Department of State, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1960–63, 745R.00/2-1660, National Archives.
206. London to Sec’y of State, Telegram no. 4088 (Feb. 18, 1960), Records of the
Department of State, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1960–63, 745R.00/2-1860, National Archives.
207. Id.
208. Land Tenure and Bill of Rights: Kenya Whites Seek to Perpetuate Evil, supra note 161.
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209
the due process of law.” According to The Times of London, it was
“understood that the Africans agree on the principle of no
expropriation without compensation: but other delegates ask how one
judges the compensation, and whether it is right that it should be used
for the settlement of Africans in the present agricultural system.”210
The Ghana Times reported that the Africans wanted to make it
“‘crystal clear’ they will always uncompromisingly uphold private
property rights of any citizen irrespective of his race or national origin
but, Ngala said, ‘we feel that the people of Kenya must preserve their
right to carry out such land reforms as will accelerate economic
betterment of the country.’”211
With the conference facing deadlock, the Ghana Times reported,
“all delegates and officials now believe that the only hope for a
compromise solution depends on Macleod taking things into his own
hands and formulating an alternative policy on which both sides
212
would be able to compromise.”
In late February the conference ended, but with the major
question of land and safeguards unresolved. While Thurgood
Marshall was no longer in London, his presence continued to be felt.
Macleod’s official report on the conference addressed the unsettled
question of safeguards. Two documents were singled out as
particularly helpful: a discussion of the Nigerian constitution, and “a
very helpful paper by Dr. Thurgood Marshall outlining the kind of
213
provisions which might help to meet the situation.” The ideas in
these documents would be put to use:

It is the firm view of Her Majesty’s Government that legal
provisions are needed in the proposed constitution, which will be
made by Order in Council, to provide for the judicial protection of
human rights, on the lines of the provisions in the Nigeria
(Constitution) Order in Council, taking into account the draft

209. Id.
210. Kenya Talks Crisis: Macleod Attempts to Break Deadlock, GHANA TIMES, Feb. 22,
1960, at 9 (quoting THE TIMES (London)).
211. Kenya Conference: Report to Be Placed Before Parliament Today, GHANA TIMES, Feb.
25, 1960, at 4.
212. Kenya Talks Crisis: Macleod Attempts to Break Deadlock, supra note 210.
213. Speech by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Kenya Constitutional Conference,
1960 (Feb. 21, 1960), Folder: Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1960, Memoranda, CO822/2357,
The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Public Records Office, Kew, England.
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prepared by Dr. Thurgood Marshall and the special circumstances of
214
Kenya.

The conference produced no final constitutional text, only Macleod’s
215
report summarizing the meeting’s accomplishments and difficulties.
The ideas in Marshall’s draft would be put to further use. In
1962, the principal nationalist party in Kenya, KANU, included
216
Marshall’s Bill of Rights in their constitutional demands. The final
1963 independence constitution would contain very detailed clauses
regarding confiscation of land for public purposes, along the lines that
Marshall had supported in 1960.217
At the end of the meeting, most of the major players agreed to
go forward with the agreements they had reached so far, but the allwhite United Party “denounced [the] conference as [a] death-blow to
218
[the] European community,” and said that “the reported proposals
would virtually mean that Europeans and Asians would no longer
have genuine representation.”219 In contrast, the “Africans appeared
220
willing [to] go ahead to [the] next phase.” The Ghana Times called
the resolution of the conference “a victory for the African
Nationalists, who were, after due thought and consideration,
supported by the Colonial Secretary.”221 Meanwhile, white settlers
were reportedly calling Macleod’s constitutional proposals “a Mau
Mau victory.”222 The future remained uncertain. The U.S. Embassy in
London was of the opinion that “Macleod has only just managed [to]
avoid [a] conference breakdown and that local Kenya reaction to
[the] positions of [the] three principal groups may jeopardize [the]
223
results.”

214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Nairobi to SecState Washington, Airgram no. A-69 (Nov. 28, 1961), Records of the
Department of State, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1960-63, 745r.03/11-2861, National Archives.
217. CONSTITUTION, Ch. II (1963) (Kenya), available at http://www.4cskenyatuitakayo.org/
downloads/1963Constitution.pdf.
218. London to Sec’y of State, Telegram no. 4129 (Feb. 22, 1960), Records of the
Department of State, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1960–63, 745R.00/2-2260, National Archives.
219. Kenya African Leaders Appeal for Calm, GHANA TIMES, Feb. 15, 1960, at 4.
220. London to Sec’y of State, Telegram no. 4129, supra note 218.
221. Africans Win at Kenya Talks, GHANA TIMES, Feb. 15, 1960, at 9.
222. Editorial, Kenya Talks, GHANA TIMES, Feb. 18, 1960, at 2.
223. London to Sec’y of State, Telegram no. 4129, supra note 218.
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Macleod’s proposals were then “endorsed by Her Majesty’s
224
Government.” The constitution was now called the “Macleod
Constitution,” identified with the Colonial Secretary in the same way
that earlier constitutions, less based on deliberation, had been
identified with previous officials.225 The constitution was no longer an
agreement that Africans would embrace, however, but rather a
colonial position that would be a starting point for their arguments
about further change. Meanwhile, the U.S. Consul in Kenya assessed
the conference this way: “[I]t would appear that [Britain] has made
up its mind to divest itself of its colonial responsibilities in Africa as
expeditiously as feasible.”226
With independence and an eventual African government on the
horizon, a new climate of negotiation emerged back in Nairobi,
although colonial politics would be further complicated by an
eventual split among nationalists and the formation of two principal
227
nationalist parties. The New Kenya Party would ultimately propose
a formula for resolving the land issue. According to Colin Leys,
[i]t soon became clear that the essence of the formula must be to
have the incoming African settlers purchase the land with funds lent
to them by the new Kenya government, which in turn would be lent

224. Amconsul Nairobi to Dep’t of State, Despatch no. 402 (Mar. 1, 1960), Records of the
Department of State, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1960–63, 745R.00/3-160, National Archives.
225. See KYLE, supra note 65, at 63, 81–82, 102–07 (identifying Kenya constitutions with
reference to Colonial Secretaries).
226. Amconsul Nairobi to Dep’t of State, Despatch no. 407 (Mar. 3, 1960), Records of the
Department of State, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1960–63, 745R.00/3-360, National Archives.
What sort of decolonization did the British have in mind? Even before the Lancaster
House conference, the British government was developing plans for what would follow. British
officials told U.S. Consul Charles D. Withers that “[v]arious British officials in Kenya were . . .
trying now to establish such firm control of the Colony’s government departments that incoming
African ministers would be little more than figureheads.” Amconsul Nairobi to Dep’t of State,
Despatch no. 344 (Jan. 14, 1960), Records of the Department of State, RG 59, Central Decimal
File, 1960–63, 745R.00/1-1460, National Archives. African nationalists, including Mboya, told
Withers that they were aware of these plans. According to Withers, the British planned to
strengthen high-level, entrenched British civil service employees in Kenya. Then when an
African became a minister and wanted to do something, the British officials would say: “That is
not the way things are done in a parliamentary system of government. These matters are
handled by the permanent secretariat and civil service staff.” Withers was told that this would
be done even for financial and policy matters. Id.
227. Ogot, supra note 69, at 61; see JENNIFER A. WIDNER, THE RISE OF A PARTY-STATE IN
KENYA: FROM “HARAMBEE!” TO “NYAYO!” 30–37 (1992) (discussing the emergence of two
major political parties in Kenya, KANU and KADU); see also DAVID THROUP & CHARLES
HORNSBY, MULTI-PARTY POLITICS IN KENYA (1998) (discussing party politics in Kenya from
1963 to 1997).
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the money by the British government, and if possible also by the
228
World Bank.

Ultimately, the nationalist leaders would agree, and this resolution
would be in place before the next Lancaster House Conference on
229
the Kenya Constitution in 1962.
Perhaps influenced by an economic crisis in the colony that,
according to Leys, was precipitated by the move toward
independence at the 1960 Lancaster House Conference, upon his
release in 1961, Kenyatta would emphasize that property rights would
be protected by the future African government, and that “[w]e will
encourage investors in various projects to come to Kenya and carry
on their business peacefully, in order to bring prosperity to this
230
In light of these developments, land and the
country.”
compensation clauses, a focus of the 1960 meeting, were not a major
issue in later constitutional negotiations, which would turn instead on
regional versus national government, tribal politics, and federalism.
The final 1963 independence constitution would contain very detailed
clauses regarding confiscation of land for public purposes, along the
lines that Marshall had supported in 1960.231

228. COLIN LEYS, UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN KENYA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
NEOCOLONIALISM 1964–1971, at 55 (1975). According to Leys, this formula “was adumbrated
in the New Kenya Group’s thinking during 1960, after the first Lancaster House Conference of
January 1960 at which the British government finally made it clear that there would be an
elected African majority in the next Kenyan legislature.” Id. at 56.
229. According to Leys, “it may well seem puzzling why the African leaders should have
agreed to [the formula], especially since a militant wing of the leading African party, the Kenya
African National Union (KANU[)] . . . had been calling for land transfer without
compensation.” Possible reasons for this included
the moderating influence of Kenyatta; the fear of independence being delayed; the
hope of changing things after independence; a lack of interest in the detail of the
negotiations; a fear that the rival party, the Kenya African Democratic Union
(KADU), for whose supporters the land issue was less vital . . . , might agree to the
proposed scheme first and perhaps manage to get KANU excluded from the
transitional government; and finally, the risk of alienating the former forest fighters if
they were not provided with land quickly.
Id. The emergence of KADU, and the KANU/KADU rivalry, so important in subsequent
negotiations, developed between the 1960 and 1962 Lancaster House Conferences. KYLE, supra
note 65, at 118.
230. LEYS, supra note 228, at 62; JOMO KENYATTA, SUFFERING WITHOUT BITTERNESS:
THE FOUNDING OF THE KENYA NATION 147 (1968).
231. The 1963 Kenya Constitution provisions on property rights are, in part, as follows:
19. (1) No property of any description shall be compulsorily taken possession of, and
no interest in or right over property of any description shall be compulsorily acquired,
except where the following conditions are satisfied, that is to say:
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But when constitutional negotiations came to a close in February
1960, in Nairobi this future was far from certain. Twenty Kenyan
political leaders including Michael Blundell, leader of the multiracial
New Kenya Group, and Ronald Ngala, African leader, arrived at the
Nairobi airport upon returning from Lancaster House. Blundell was
greeted by whites shouting “Traitor,” and “Thirty Pieces of Silver.” A
white man with a microphone yelled, “Congratulations, Mr. Ngala,
you stood by your policies. Blundell, you have sold your own people.”

(a) the taking of possession or acquisition is necessary in the interests of
defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, town and
country planning or the development or utilization of property in such a manner
as to promote the public benefit; and
(b) the necessity therefor is such as to afford reasonable justification for the
causing of any hardship that may result to any person having an interest in or
right over the property; and
(c) provision is made by a law applicable to that taking of possession or
acquisition for the prompt payment of full compensation.
(2) Every person having an interest or right in or over property which is compulsorily
taken possession of or whose interest in or right over any property is compulsorily
acquired shall have a right of direct access to the Supreme Court for:
(a) the determination of his interest or right, the legality of the taking of
possession or acquisition of the property, interest or right, and the amount of
any compensation to which he is entitled; and
(b) the purpose of obtaining prompt payment of that compensation:
Provided that if Parliament so provides in relation to any matter referred to in
paragraph (a) of this subsection the right of access shall be by way of appeal
(exercisable as of right at the instance of the person having the right or interest
in the property) from a tribunal or authority, other than the Supreme Court,
having jurisdiction under any law to determine that matter.
(3) The Chief Justice may make rules with respect to the practice and procedure of
the Supreme Court or any other tribunal or authority in relation to the jurisdiction
conferred on the Supreme Court by subsection (2) of this section or exercisable by
the other tribunal or authority for the purposes of that subsection (including rules
with respect to the time within which applications or appeals to the Supreme Court or
applications to the other tribunal or authority may be brought).
CONSTITUTION, Ch. II (1963) (Kenya), available at http://www.4cskenyatuitakayo.org/
downloads/1963Constitution.pdf.
The particular language of these provisions, and of other specific clauses, was hammered
out in ongoing negotiations in Kenya between the 1960 conference and subsequent Lancaster
House conferences. The Kenya Constitution has been amended several times since 1963, but
substantive changes have not been made to these clauses. Compare id., with CONSTITUTION, Ch.
V (1998) (Kenya), available at http://www.4cskenyatuitakayo.org/downloads/The%20Kenyan%
20Current%20Constitution.pdf.
Constitutional scholars sometimes assume that similar constitutions were imposed by the
British on former colonies, but the Kenya example reveals a different experience of hard
bargaining among competing interests. This suggests that any similarities with other British
postcolonial constitutions were not simply imported from one constitution to another, but
instead were successfully bargained for by parties to the Kenya negotiations.
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An African shouted in response, “Blundell, you will get our votes if
232
necessary. You have sold nobody. You are all right.”
Mboya, Odinga, and other nationalists would have a different
experience when they arrived a couple of days later. They were met
at the airport by thousands of Africans. The new constitution would
not last, Mboya told the crowd. “[The] struggle [had] only begun,”
233
and a move toward independence would happen “immediately.”
There was a place in Kenya for all races, Mboya said, but “those who
234
did not believe in democracy should sell out and leave.” Kenya’s
destiny, Kiano emphasized, was “for [the] first time turned over to
Africans.”235
Twenty-five thousand people attended a gathering at the African
Stadium. Mboya asked the crowd whether they supported the stand
taken by the African delegation on the Kenyan Constitution. If they
did, he asked them to raise their hands. Around African Stadium, the
press reported, “nearly every hand [was] raised.”236
The crowd was “jubilant.” Not willing to let this moment of
promise slip away, as the leaders left the stadium, “crowds began [to]
follow Mboya home.”237 When they reached the city limits police tried
to turn them back. When they would not disperse, the “riot act [was]
read.”238 At this point in the American Consul’s telegram reporting on
the incidents, the description of what followed was very simple: “tear
239
gas used and baton charges made, crowd eventually disbursing.” It
is impossible to know how violent this confrontation was. In the end,
240
only two people were reported to be injured. Perhaps the incident
best illustrated the limits of Colonial authority in Kenya in 1960.
Colonial police could suppress a demonstration, but a spirit of
independence was alive in Kenya, and no tear gas canisters or police
batons could make it go away.

232. Blundell Heckled by Whites in Kenya, GHANA TIMES, Feb. 26, 1960, at 12.
233. Nairobi to Sec’y of State, Telegram no. 310 (Feb. 29, 1960), Records of the Department
of State, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1960–63, 745R.00/2-2960, National Archives.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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CONCLUSION
At the 1960 conference on the Kenya Constitution, the issue of
greatest concern to Marshall—property rights and their impact on
minority rights—was so volatile that it interfered with the Colonial
Secretary’s efforts to bring the Conference to a successful conclusion.
In the controversy among delegates, Marshall’s ideas played a key
role. It is possible that his position on constitutional questions may
have placed him in tension with some of the nationalists he was there
to support, nevertheless, having Marshall as an advisor was of great
political value for the nationalists. When pressed as to whether
extending political power to them would abrogate the rights of the
white minority, the nationalists could point to the fact that their
constitutional advisor had devoted his career to the protection of
minority rights.
Thurgood Marshall and other American civil rights lawyers took
American legal ideas to Africa and had an impact. When these
sojourners returned home, they brought their African experience
with them.241 Thurgood Marshall maintained ties with his Kenya
colleagues, and although he was not present at later constitutional
negotiations, his work on the Bill of Rights continued to be
influential.242
Tom Mboya wrote to Marshall in March 1960. “I do not know
whether it will ever be enough to write letters to thank you for your
good work at the London Conference,” he said.

241. For example, when Pauli Murray returned from a year in Ghana, Africa was intermixed
with America on the walls of her small New Haven apartment. Her African experience was
integrated into her life, as she maintained a strong interest in legal development in Africa. See
Pauli Murray, On Teaching Constitutional Law in Ghana, YALE L. REP., Fall 1961, at 10, 10–14;
Thurgood Marshall’s Copy of Letter from Pauli Murray to Family and Friends (July 10, 1962),
Papers of Thurgood Marshall, U.S. Court of Appeals, General Correspondence, Box 5, Folder:
“M” Miscellaneous, 1961–63, Library of Congress (describing Murray’s return to the U.S. after
teaching in Ghana); see also KEVIN K. GAINES, AMERICAN AFRICANS IN GHANA: BLACK
EXPATRIATES AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 110–35 (2006) (discussing Murray’s time in Ghana
and the tension she encountered between her defense of American constitutionalism and the
Ghanaian government); LINDA KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES 188–99
(1998) (discussing Murray as a civil rights lawyer); Paul L. Edenfield, The American
Heartbreak: A Biographical Sketch of Pauli Murray (2000), http://www.stanford.edu/group/
WLHP/papers/paulimurray.pdf (examining Murray’s life through her personal and professional
writings).
242. In later negotiations, the nationalist Kenya African National Union party demands
included a Bill of Rights based on Marshall’s draft. Nairobi to Sec’y of State, Airgram A-69,
supra note 216. British records on subsequent negotiations on the Kenya Constitution confirm
Marshall’s continuing influence.
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[A]s you yourself said, you were glad to come home, we were glad to
receive you home. I am sure I speak the mind of all of us, that you
were the easiest man to work with, and that any of us who had
apprehension before you came were easily disarmed as soon as we
met you. Further the co-operation that we had from you has led to a
greater understanding of the Negro/African problem.
I hope we shall play a bigger part in extending this friendship and
243
relationship beyond the boundaries of just you and us.”

Thurgood Marshall and Jomo Kenyatta, in Nairobi, Kenya, July 14, 1963, during
Marshall’s return trip to Kenya. © Corbis.

243.

Tom Mboya to Thurgood Marshall, supra note 164.
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Marshall developed a deep affection for Jomo Kenyatta after his
release in 1961. Berl Bernhard, Staff Director of the U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights from 1961 to 1963 traveled to Kenya with Marshall on
a U.S. State Department sponsored trip in July 1963, and spent much
time talking with him about the country. He thought Marshall
attributed “more goodness across the board to Kenyatta than I had
ever read or heard was appropriate.” The reason seemed to be his
focus on the task at hand: bringing a subject people to independence.
Bernhard told Marshall, “This guy’s not all clean,” and Marshall said,
“what do you expect?” According to Bernhard, “He wanted to
protect that freedom, period.”244 And so, although he fought with
Kenyatta in 1963 over the implementation of the rights Marshall had
cared so much about writing, this time in the context of discrimination
against Asians, he remained proud of the work he had done and his
245
Bill of Rights.
Marshall was an honored guest of Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta
246
at Kenya’s independence ceremonies in December 1963. After
traveling to Kenya in 1978 to attend Kenyatta’s funeral, as Kenya was
slipping into a dark period under President Daniel Arap Moi,247
Marshall nevertheless remarked that he was “happy to find that the
Schedule of Rights that I drew for the Kenyan Government was
working very well.”248 Within an American conception of
constitutionalism, this comment may seem strange, for Marshall’s Bill
of Rights and the constitution as a whole seemed powerless to
constrain the Kenyatta and Moi governments from abusing the
people of Kenya. Kwasi Prempeh argues that we expect too much of
courts if we think that courts could have solved the difficulties of
nation-building in Africa during the independence era.249 Marshall
seemed to be saying the same thing about constitutions. The
interesting thing, then, is that he found value in the constitution,
nevertheless. That value seemed to be in the way the constitution

244.
245.

Berl Bernhard, Oral History Interview, supra note 56.
Marshall’s 1963 trip to Kenya will be discussed in MARY L. DUDZIAK, EXPORTING
AMERICAN DREAMS: THURGOOD MARSHALL’S AFRICAN JOURNEY (expected 2008).
246. Williams, supra note 4, at 307–09; DUDZIAK, supra note 245.
247. THROUP & HORNSBY, supra note 227, at 26–50 (discussing consolidation of executive
power and repression under the Moi regime).
248. Thurgood Marshall, Civil Rights Enforcement and the Supreme Court’s Docket,
Remarks at the Second Circuit Judicial Conference (Sept. 8, 1978), in THURGOOD MARSHALL,
supra note 1, at 174, 174.
249. Prempeh, supra note 10, at 1273–74.
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aided the most fundamental step of all: enabling a people to achieve
250
independence in the first place.
Marshall remained proud of his work on the Kenya Constitution.
It was better than the original U.S. Constitution had been, he
thought. In the U.S. Constitution, the Bill of Rights was a set of
amendments. In the Kenya Constitution, the Bill of Rights was there
251
in the original.
As he described it, the Bill of Rights “gave the white citizen
living in Kenya absolute protection, the strongest, I maintained, of
252
any constitution in the world, spelled out in detail.” And in spite of
the vast historical and material differences in the minority experience
in Kenya and the United States, he would often emphasize a point he
made in an oral history interview: “That, to my mind, is really
working toward democracy, when you can give to the white man in
Africa what you couldn’t give the black man in Mississippi. It’s

250. Constitutional politics have regained importance in Kenya. After years of authoritarian
rule, in the context of democratization in other regions of the world, President Daniel Arap Moi
stepped down in 2002, in keeping with constitutional term limits that had been adopted in 1992.
Moi appointed a Constitutional Review Commission in 2000, with constitutional scholar Yash
Ghai as Chair, and the commission proposed constitutional revisions in 2002. Multi-party
elections for Moi’s replacement were infused with constitutional politics, as candidates staked
out positions on the draft constitution. President Mwai Kibaki was elected on a platform
supporting constitutional reform, and promising to bring the draft to a vote in Parliament. When
Kibaki backtracked, and ultimately supported a revised constitution with fewer limits on
presidential power, his plan was rejected by a popular vote in 2005. In anticipation of upcoming
Kenya presidential elections in 2007, commentators debate the state of constitutional politics,
and candidates are expected to include competing draft constitutions in their political platforms.
See generally WILLY MUTUNGA, CONSTITUTION MAKING FROM THE MIDDLE: CIVIL SOCIETY
AND TRANSITION POLITICS IN KENYA 1992–1997 (1999); P.L. AGWELI ONALO,
CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN KENYA: AN AFRICAN APPRAISAL (2004); Joel D. Barkan, Kenya
After Moi, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2004, at 87; Cyrus Kinyungu, Kenya: Year in Review, EAST
AFRICAN STANDARD (ONLINE EDITION) (Nairobi), Dec. 25, 2006, http://allafrica.com/stories/
200612270344.html; Joyce Mulama, Constitution in the Spotlight Again, as Elections Near, INTER
PRESS SERVICE NEWS AGENCY, Aug. 18, 2006, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=34390;
Mukoma Ngugi, KENYA: The Constitution as a Promissory Note, SOUL AFRICA, http://www.
soulafrica.com/wcms/index.php?id=2,9,0,0,1,0; Mary L. Dudziak, Conversations with Various
Kenyans in Nairobi, Kenya (July 2006); see also Preston Chitere et al., Kenya Constitutional
Documents: A Comparative Analysis (Chr. Michelsen, IPAR Working Paper No. 7, 2006),
available at http://www.cmi.no/pdf/?file=/publications/2006/rep/r2006-5.pdf; THE ANATOMY OF
BOMAS: SELECTED ANALYSES OF THE 2004 DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF KENYA (Kithure
Kindiki & Osago Ambani eds., 2005). An important new history of Kenya Constitutional
politics by Makau Mutua is forthcoming. MAKAU MUTUA, TAMING LEVIATHAN: THE QUEST
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN KENYA (forthcoming).
251. Berl Bernhard, Oral History Interview, supra note 56.
252. Marshall, supra note 1, at 445–46.
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253
good.” It may seem a puzzling irony that for this champion of
African American rights, a focus in Kenya was protection of the
rights of privileged white people. What was he doing? How did he
think about it?
If this was “working toward democracy,” as Marshall put it, it
was a rather perverse form of democracy, playing out within the halls
of the colonial power in Lancaster House. When the Kenya
Independence Constitution was completed in 1963, the final act of
ratification was not a vote of the people, but the signature of the
Queen of England. These and other antidemocratic features of latecolonial politics make it easy to dismiss the entire story of
constitutional politics in Kenya and other parts of Africa in the 1960s,
at least if we focus only on conventional, contemporary measures of
democratic politics. No wonder, among comparative constitutional
254
scholars, sub-Saharan Africa is so often left out of the conversation.
If African constitutionalism was meaningless, why did it look so
different from the perspective of the participants at the time? For
groups in Kenya, constitutional debates seemed to be the only path
away from nearly certain violence. The resistance movement had
armed itself in the forests before; with change at hand, threats of
destruction now came from the privileged. Adversaries would engage
in hard clause-by-clause constitutional bargaining between the 1960
Lancaster House Conference and independence in 1963. During the
endless hours of negotiations in Kenya and in London, as armed
conflict erupted in other parts of the continent, adversaries in Kenya
reached instead for constitutional clauses. Tribal and political
differences would split the nationalist coalition after the 1960
conference, but the new nationalist parties, KANU and KADU,
made constitutional bargaining a central feature of their political
struggles.255

253. Id. at 446.
254. See supra note 11.
255. See Nairobi to Sec’y of State, Telegram no. 612 (Feb. 13, 1962), Records of the
Department of State, RG59, Central Decimal File, 1960–63, Box 1706, 745R.03/1661, National
Archives (discussing KANU and KADU constitutional positions); Amconsul Nairobi to Dep’t
of State, Despatch no. 313 (Feb. 1, 1962), Records of the Department of State, RG59, Central
Decimal File, 1960–63, Box 1706, 745R.03/1661, National Archives (same); Amconsul Nairobi,
to Dep’t of State, Despatch no. 147 (Oct. 6, 1961), Records of the Department of State, RG59,
Central Decimal File, 1960–63, Box 1706, 745R.03/1661, National Archives (referring to
KANU-KADU constitutional talks); Amconsul Nairobi to Dep’t of State, Despatch no. 355
(Mar. 16, 1961), Records of the Department of State, RG59, Central Decimal File, 1960–63, Box
1706, 745R.03/1661, National Archives (discussing ongoing Kenya constitutional politics); KYLE,
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Thurgood Marshall’s part in this, in 1960, was to play a role in a
process that kept these adversaries at the table. In light of the bloody
256
alternative, that, in itself, was an accomplishment. As Kenya moved
toward majority rule, and “minority safeguards” became the order of
the day, Marshall’s mere presence was of political value to the
nationalists. There was nothing they could do to reassure the United
Party, but it helped their position with white moderates, the British
Government, and the international press that one of their advisors
was a well-known champion of minority rights.
When Marshall wrote a Bill of Rights for Kenya, he built into it
many robust, forward-looking rights, beyond those that the United
States has ever seen in the area of economic rights, and more
expansive than the rights in the final Kenya independence
constitution would be. But on the question of equality and property—
the paradox of entrenching rights gained through historic injustice—
was he placing form over substance? Was this, perhaps, an earlier
manifestation of a contemporary phenomenon that, for David
Kennedy, is one of “the dark sides of virtue,” as building a rule of law
is turned to as a development strategy in itself, “which obscures the
need for distributional choices or for clarity about how distributing
things one way rather than another will, in fact, lead to
development”?257 The result is a “sleight of hand, positioning the rule
of law as a substitute for politics and economics.”258 Perhaps in Kenya,
“minority rights” was an abstract moniker that obscured the
necessary trade-offs on the critical issue of land reform.
It is in describing that particular aspect of the Bill of Rights that
Marshall emphasized that he was “working toward democracy.” This
tells us not necessarily what he, in substance, accomplished, but how
he would like us to remember it.
Marshall’s harsher critics might see him as taking a limited role
in a messy and ongoing political struggle but casting it in grandiose
supra note 65, at 115–18 (describing Kenya constitutional negotiations in the years leading to
independence).
256. Some resistance groups, however, argued that armed struggle would have resulted in
more meaningful social change. See generally MAU MAU & NATIONHOOD: ARMS, AUTHORITY
& NARRATION (E.S. Atieno Odhiambo & John Lonsdale eds., 2003). For an argument that
Western hegemony must be circumvented for true democratization based on Africa political
consciousness to emerge, see CLAUDE AKE, THE FEASIBILITY OF DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA
(2000).
257. DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIANISM 155 (2004).
258. Id. at 157.
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diplomatic terms. Perhaps in working toward democracy he had taken
himself beyond the courthouse and onto a broader public stage, one
that might help recast him as a lawyer serving the national interest in
a way that might gain the attention of the incoming Kennedy
administration, in the hopes that they might tap him for a coveted
court seat.259 From this perspective, by saying that he was working
toward democracy, he was telling listeners how important his work
had been.
But perhaps Marshall was also saying something about a
substantive conception of democracy. One reading might be that in
protecting the rights of whites, Marshall was embracing formal
260
equality, and was abstracting his conception of equality from the
material conditions on the ground in Kenya. Readers may find this
idea incredulous. There was such material inequality in Kenya, how
could one speak of rights in formal, abstract terms? But American
civil rights leaders of this era often spoke about equality in this way.261
It was as if generalizing rights to all of humanity made others able to
see them more clearly, perhaps made them more acceptable, and
therefore more within reach. But if Marshall embraced formal
equality in Kenya, thereby entrenching a legacy of historic injustice,
might he be denying Martin Luther King’s argument that “law and
order exist for the purpose of establishing justice”?262 Perhaps there is
a particular wrong in using the tools of law to entrench injustice
rather than eradicate it.

259. For this point, I am grateful to Mike Meltsner. Although not embracing this
interpretation, he suggested it as a possibility. On Greenberg as Marshall’s replacement, see
MICHAEL MELTSNER, THE MAKING OF A CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER 99–103 (2006).
260. Deborah L. Rhode, who clerked for Marshall when he was a Justice on the U.S.
Supreme Court, argues that “the Justice was careful never to confuse formal and substantive
justice.” He opposed efforts to stop race-based affirmative action programs in the name of
color-blindness, believing that such arguments represented “commitments to formal equality
and racial neutrality [that] came several generations too early and several centuries too late.”
Deborah L. Rhode, Letting the Law Catch Up, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1259, 1260, 1263 (1992).
261. Although not a formalist, Martin Luther King, Jr. discussed just and unjust laws in
abstract terms in his Letter from Birmingham Jail:
An unjust law is a code that a numerical or power majority group compels a minority
group to obey but does not make binding on itself. This is difference made legal. By
the same token, a just law is a code that a majority compels a minority to follow and
that it is willing to follow itself. This is sameness made legal.
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 77, 85
(1963).
262. Id. at 88.
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If it was a formal equality that he embraced, it could not have
been based on a lack of awareness of its implications, an abstraction
that might distance him from the moral consequences of the tradeoffs of his theory. In arguing against abstraction, James Baldwin
insisted that “it is not permissible that the authors of devastation
should also be innocent. It is the innocence which constitutes the
263
Marshall had worked among the Lancaster House
crime.”
adversaries for weeks, and he was well aware that he was entrenching
rights of the privileged residents of “Happy Valley,” a white settler
community that had nurtured a decadent culture through white
power and black subordination.264 The question to ask instead is why
knowingly entrenching such rights was so important to him.
“That, to my mind, is really working toward democracy,” he said,
“when you can give to the white man in Africa what you couldn’t give
the black man in Mississippi. It’s good.”265
“when you can give,”
that is, when you have the power to give.
“what you couldn’t give,”
that is, what you didn’t have the power to give.
Perhaps he was speaking of himself, and what it meant to act in a
manner that he conceived of as democratic, when conditions allowed
him to create structures of equality in one context, yet not in another.
In later years he would criticize the framers of the United States
Constitution for having framed an undemocratic document that
266
embraced slavery. In his oral history, we can see the way he would
like us to remember his role as a framer: as protecting the rights of an
“other” very unlike himself. He presents this as “working toward
democracy.”267

263.
264.

BALDWIN, supra note 23, at 19–20.
See generally NICHOLAS BEST, HAPPY VALLEY: THE STORY OF THE ENGLISH IN
KENYA (1979) (tracing the history of affluent white settlers in Kenya and the resulting
entrenched political and economic power of whites prior to Kenya’s independence).
265. Marshall, supra note 1, at 446.
266. Marshall, supra note 14, at 1–5.
267. Beyond the property clauses, Marshall’s vision for democracy in Kenya is reflected in
the progressive, forward-looking Bill of Rights he wrote. The importance of rights to his
conception of democracy helps us to see the importance of law, American-style courts and
judicial review, and lawyers to the democracy he envisioned. For a discussion of democracy and
constitutionalism in the American context, see generally FRANK I. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND
DEMOCRACY (1999).
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It mattered most to him to keep these parties talking to each
other, and doing so required a document that all the principals could
live with. While democracy requires much more, it could begin with
268
bargaining rather than bullets. Thurgood Marshall, alone, did not
staunch the violence in Kenya, of course, but he was part of a process
of constitutional politics, a moment of constitutionalism that mattered
in Kenya.
What we might see in this story is a historical example of the
broader problem of how to make present politics out of a history of
violence, and when the tables have turned, the question of whether
democracy can require the subordination of a history of injustice to
keep some parties at the table. We have seen many examples in the
bloody history of the twentieth century of efforts to create a forward269
looking politics following historic injustice. The most dramatic of
these, perhaps, were the international efforts after World War II, not
only to bring Nazi war criminals to justice, but also to create an
international body dedicated to the hope that a global politics could
270
prevent war. In more recent years, constitution writing has become
a familiar ritual to signal change from one political regime to another.
New constitutions at times reflect the departure from an unjust
regime through the embrace of particular substantive rights.271 In this

268. Cf. Fisher, supra note 14, at 138–40 (discussing Marshall’s belief in the rule of law);
Randall Kennedy & Martha Minow, Thurgood Marshall and Procedural Law: Lawyer’s Lawyer,
Judge’s Judge, 6 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 95, 99–100 (1989) (same).
269. See generally MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING
HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998) (exploring how countries have
responded formally on a national or international level to incidents of mass violence with
processes including trials, truth commissions and reparations to recoup dignity of victims of
violence, enable forgiveness, remember the cultural history of victims, and make a record of the
mass violence itself).
270. See generally GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE
POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS (2000) (critically examining use of international war
crimes tribunals); PETER MAGUIRE, LAW AND WAR: AN AMERICAN STORY (2000) (arguing
that the Nuremberg trials exemplified twentieth century efforts by the United States aimed at
replacing retributive violence with international law); STANLEY MEISLER, THE UNITED
NATIONS: THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS (1995) (discussing successes and failures of the United
Nations in its efforts to prevent war, and how those efforts grew from its founding after World
War II).
271. The Constitution of South Africa, for example, provides restitution for some victims of
apartheid, while at the same time protecting white minority property rights. See JOSEPH
WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 192 (2000) (describing how
the post-apartheid South African constitution simultaneously protects the property rights of the
white minority and provides for economic benefits to victims of human rights violations); VAN
DER WALT, supra note 11, at 320–58 (comparing the property clauses of the Constitution of
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way the outcome of constitutional politics—the text itself—can be the
272
mechanism for addressing a country’s historic injustice.
Perhaps Marshall is showing us another way to think about it:
that there is justice in the process. If constitutional negotiations were
not successful, he warned before the Lancaster House conference, it
could result in a “new uprising in Kenya that nobody can control—
273
any more than they could control Mau Mau.” It was writing a
constitution itself that kept these adversaries out of the trenches and
kept the weapons of violence, at least for a time, out of their hands.
Perhaps for Marshall, giving whites in Africa what he hadn’t been
able to give blacks in Mississippi—writing a Bill of Rights with the full
knowledge that it entrenched a historic injustice—kept democratic
politics in motion. What resulted was not a fully formed, ideal
democratic constitution, but was a path left open, a way to continue
working toward democracy.
That these efforts had profound limits was clear long before
Marshall’s first contact with Kenya, Tom Mboya, once groomed to
replace Kenyatta, lay dead in the streets of Nairobi from an assassin’s
bullets in 1969. Thurgood Marshall never forgot about Kenya, but
during his years on the Supreme Court, his principal engagement
seemed to be with his memories of the early 1960s, rather than with
the dark turn in later Kenya politics.274 He recounted stories of Kenya
to his colleagues, his law clerks, and his friends. In telling the story, it
was at least his object to make it part of the story of his life.

South Africa Act 200 of 1993 and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of
1996).
272. See the work of Kim Scheppele, supra note 15.
273. Kikuyu Protest at Second Advisor: Telegram from Loyalists Sent to Mr. Macleod, supra
note 127.
274. In this respect, his experience mirrored others. In his study of African-American
engagement with Africa from 1935 to 1961, James Meriwether argues that through much of the
twentieth century, African Americans engaged with Africa tended to “focus on countries
embroiled in national liberation struggles, as opposed to countries that already had gained
independence.” This “enabled African Americans to continue building transatlantic bridges
while finessing direct engagement with the deep complications of independent Africa.”
MERIWETHER, supra note 16, at 5.

